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Abstract
This paper examines empirically the effects of the WTO and RTA membership
on the extensive and the intensive margins of trade. Using disaggregated data for a
sample of 177 countries, the main findings of this paper are that WTO membership
tends to increase the number of products traded between members (extensive mar-
gin), and tends to increase the average sales per product line (intensive margin).
I further detect substantial heterogeneity when I examine these effects for various
subsamples of the data (e.g. by the degree of product differentiation or the level of
development of a country). This demonstrates that many of the aggregate effects
estimated in the existing literature (e.g. Rose 2004) hide a substantial amount of
variation in the WTO’s effect on trade. Finally, accounting for multilateral resis-
tance as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), I find that the WTO effect becomes
insignificant, while the RTA membership boosts trade between members and be-
tween members and outsiders at least in the aggregate level.1
Keywords: WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, Extensive margin, Intensive
Margin, Poisson Regression.
JEL Classification Numbers : F13, F15
1 Introduction
One of the well documented facts in international economics is the outstanding increase
in world exports after World War II. This contrasts with the previous period, the inter
∗Department of Economics, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom,
schris@essex.ac.uk, Tel. 00441206874234. Special thanks to my supervisors Joao M. C. Santos Silva
and Holger Breinlich for their substantial help and guidance during the completion of this piece of re-
search. Many Thanks to Dr Carmen Li for useful discussions on this work. I would Like to thank Dr
Paola De Agostini for technical help during the completion of this work. The author is responsible for
any mistakes and opinions expressed in this paper.
1Joining the WTO or an RTA would mean positive trade creation among members and negative trade
divertion (negative effect on trade) between members and non members. In the current study there are
cases in which we estimate a positive and not negative trade diversion effect. For the WTO case, a possible
explanation would be the WTO public good effect as mentioned in Subramanian and Wei (2007). In
the case of an RTA positive trade diversion effect, possible explanations would be improvement in the
transportation costs with non members or a case in which an agreement has boosted members’ income,
and there is increased demand from members for non members’ commodities, that are not available in
the context of the RTA agreement (see Hilbun et al., 2006).
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war era, when world trade faced a dramatic reduction. The post-war trade recovery
coincided with the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in
1947, which was later replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, whose
purpose was to reduce trade barriers and help the free flow of trade among the members.
GATT started with 23 members and has now reached over 150 current members. On the
other hand, the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the number of countries
participating in them has experienced a large increase especially during the last 30 years.
Until the establishment of the WTO there have been 124 notifications of RTAs and since
1995 about 300 new ones.
Apart from these empirical facts, there are some theoretical arguments that connect
multilateral trade liberalization with trade boosting effects. These arguments focus on
the terms of trade argument and political- commitment argument. According to the
first argument, trade liberalization helps countries to coordinate their trade policies and
not get involved in tariff increases that reduce the volume of trade. If a large country
imposes an import tariff, this harms the foreign exporters’ terms of trade as the world
price for their products will fall. To avoid this, governments will impose higher than
optimal tariffs and this would harm world trade. GATT/WTO membership could be
a mechanism that ensures that the country members do not get involved in such tariff
wars (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2001). The second argument claims that participation
in the WTO commits governments in their private sectors to policies that aim at freeing
trade. This commitment could result in avoiding efficiency losses, that are the results
of maintaining high tariffs to protect import competing sectors (Staiger and Tabellini,
1999). This commitment is also enhanced by the dispute settlement mechanism by the
WTO.
All these arguments and empirical facts indicate that we should attribute some trade
enhancing role to the creation of WTO and RTAs.2 This common logic was challenged
by Rose (2004a), who found no significant trade boosting role for the WTO membership
in a large panel of 178 countries. Other authors refine Rose’s analysis but there is no
concluding consensus on the effect of the WTO membership on trade. Some studies
confirm Rose’s result but some others find a positive effect. These studies are based on
aggregate trade data.
Recently Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) in a study reveal the importance of considering
total trade but also its decomposition in two margins: the extensive and intensive margin.
The extensive margin is usually defined as the number of products traded between a pair
of countries or the number of markets to which a country exports. The intensive margin is
defined as the average trade volume in already existing products or destination markets.
The authors decompose trade in the two margins and they are able to uncover a positive
effect of WTO membership on the two trade margins. This was the first study in which
even though aggregate trade data are used, trade growth is decomposed through a Tobit
estimation. In the current study, the number of product categories traded between a
2Later in this paper we will refer to the terms trade creation and trade diversion. The former term
means that an RTA partner substitutes another RTA member’s less efficient industry in the production of
a good. This effect is beneficial. The latter term means that an RTA partner substitutes a more efficient
non-member supplier of a good, by exploiting the preferential tariff it faces from other RTA members.
This effect is harmful. While conventional practice is to measure welfare losses from trade diversion to
assess the desirability of an RTA, in the current paper we follow the majority of the empirical literature
that use dummy variables to pick up the trade creation and diversion effects. See Cardamone (2007), for
a survey of the literature that uses dummy variables to assess the effects of trade creation and diversion
of different RTAs.
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pair of countries in a given year and the trade volume per product category are used as
definitions for the extensive and intensive margins respectively.
In this study we use highly disaggregated data to the fourth and fifth digit and we
construct measures of the two trade margins. We start by replicating Rose’s insignificant
effects for the WTO when we aggregate our trade flows in the way he does in his analysis
and use his benchmark specification. However, once we decompose trade in the two
margins, we are able to find a positive effect of the WTO via both margins. The effect
on the extensive margin turns out to be more robust. Our analysis shows that the overall
insignificant result found by Rose is the result of defining the dependent variable in a
way that does not follow the gravity theory and using a biased estimator. Moreover, this
study uses Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) as a more appropriate method of estimating trade flows via a gravity specification.
The results of the Poisson regressions are our preferred results and in Appendix A we
present OLS results for comparison with the previous literature. Finally, we conduct
an extensive heterogeneity analysis. The WTO effect is expected to differ by level of
development and different types of products and sectors. This is because among the
WTO country members the ones that have mostly undergone extensive tariff reductions
were developed economies. Moreover, many countries still keep tariff protection on import
competing sectors such as textiles and food. Subramanian and Wei (2007) were the first
to undertake such an analysis, but they did not analyze the effect on average sales and
number of products per sector. This is something carried out additionally in the current
study.
Chaney (2008) provides theoretical grounds for the effects of trade liberalization,
defined as a reduction in variable/fixed cost, on the extensive and the intensive margins
of trade. The effects depend on the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The
model predicts that higher elasticity of substitution will make the intensive margin more
sensitive than the extensive margin to changes in the trade barriers. Many empirical
studies have shown that trade barriers have a larger effect on the extensive margin of
differentiated products (lower elasticity of substitution). In this paper we also separate
products by degree of differentiation according to Rauch (1999) and try to see if the
WTO effect is consistent with the predictions of Chaney (2008). This might indicate
which product categories developing economies should focus on if they want to reap the
majority of any potential benefits associated with their accession to the WTO.3
These results are relevant for policy makers. For policy makers, on the one hand,
joining the WTO or other multilateral systems suggests that they should expect a trade
boosting effect, as already exporting firms or new sectors will be in a position to export
their final products since a reduction of trade barriers increases the number of products
traded. On the other hand, the average sales of exporters might decrease (the intensive
margin). Therefore, this suggests that there is a benefit by joining the WTO as more
firms might export, but due to higher competition the demand and market share of some
firms may be decreased. However, this could be a purely mechanical effect. After a
3We need to acknowledge that the accession of a country to the WTO does not indicate trade liberal-
ization in every case. The accession of each economy is dcided on a country by country basis. Moreover,
given that sectors as agriculture and textiles remain still highly protected, many developing countries
like Peru and India, remained highly inward until the 1990s. We do not have a way to directly control
this difference between the point in time when a country accedes to the WTO and the point where actual
trade liberalization in the country takes place. This is partially taken into account in the section were
we split the WTO effect by sector and have a clearer view about the effect on countries that specialize
in different sectors.
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reduction in trade barriers, new exporters enter the market and they sell a small quantity
to test their performance as exporters. Then once their profits are realized they can either
continue exporting or stop. After trade liberalization, the number of traded varieties can
increase but because new exporters sell small quantities, the average sales are reduced.
This argument is in line with the recent work by Albornoz et al. (2009).
Trade in more varieties is positively associated with welfare gains and economic
growth. The welfare implications from an increase in the number of products or va-
rieties traded is well documented in new trade theory (Krugman, 1980) as well as by
more recent studies as in Romer (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006). Krugman de-
velops a model of monopolistic competition with identical firms and shows that trade
leads to an increase in the market size. This combined with increasing returns to scale
leads firms to specialize in the production of particular varieties taking advantage of the
returns to scale in production. The result is higher output (scale) and a larger number
of products. Consumers are better off due to higher real wages and increased choice.
Romer (1994) concludes that the GDP loss is much lower in a model with a constant
number of products compared to a varying number of products (6.25% compared to 47%
respectively for a tariff rate equal to 25% for the particular model considered). Broda
and Weinstein (2006) estimate the welfare gains for the United States due to an increase
in the number of available varieties and found that the US consumers would be willing to
spend 2.6 % of their income to consume the goods available in 2001 compared to those
in 1972. These two studies indicate the welfare gains from trading more products could
be substantial. Finally, studies like Funke and Ruhwedel (2001a, 2001b) show a positive
link between export variety and productivity and economic growth. Revealing a trade
enhancing WTO effect on the extensive margin would indicate an important impact on
all the three above lines of research.
Finally, this paper considers potential bias in the WTO estimates by presenting results
when the multilateral resistance terms, as outlined in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003),
are considered. The authors point out that the trade flow between two countries depends
not only on their bilateral trade costs. It is their bilateral trade costs relative to the
average cost with third trade partners (multilateral resistance) that matters. Bilateral
trade will actually be decreasing to the ratio of their bilateral trade costs relative to
the average trade cost with the rest of the world. Therefore, we expect countries like
Australia and New Zealand that are distant from the rest of the world (average cost with
other partners is high) but close to each other (bilateral trade costs are low) to trade
more with each other compared to their other trading partners.
The results indicate that the WTO effect without considering the multilateral resis-
tance term is inflated. The WTO effect becomes negative, but insignificant once mul-
tilateral resistance is considered in our analysis. On the other hand, the effect of RTA
membership is positive for RTA members on the aggregate both for members, and for
members and the outsiders. These results suggest that while member economies are ben-
efiting by sharing free trade within a region, the result of the WTO is inflated, if we do
not consider the multilateral resistance terms. This is analysed in Section 4.6.4.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the
literature most closely related to this study. In Section 3 we describe the empirical
model and the datasets used. Also the estimation method is outlined in Section 3.3.
Section 4 presents the main results of the current study. Section 5 presents an extensive
heterogeneity analysis and how the analysis changes when multilateral resistance is taken
into account. The final section summarizes the main findings of this study and proposes
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future steps for research that could be undertaken.
2 Existing Literature
In this section we briefly analyze the strands of literature most closely related to the
current study. The first strand of literature connected to the current study is the work
on the effects of the WTO on trade flows. Rose (2004a) makes the first attempt to
empirically assess the effects of the WTO on trade. The author uses aggregate trade
data for 178 countries between the years 1948 and 1999. Also the role of RTA and
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) together with the WTO effect is examined.
The GSP system is a system of preferential treatment that developed economies offer on
imports from developing economies. The imports from developing economies under this
scheme are subjected to lower tariffs compared to products imported from countries that
are not part of this scheme. Many authors have studied the effect of this system on trade
flows between the countries that grant the preferences and their beneficiaries. Rose uses
a GSP dummy to obtain a clear cut effect of the WTO, clean of any potential GSP effect
on trade flows. The author uses two dummy variables to capture the role of the WTO,
the first equals 1 if both countries in a pair are members of the WTO in year t and the
second equals 1 if only one of the two countries in a country pair is a member of the
WTO. Rose uses a gravity model augmented with these two dummy variables and finds
no statistically significant effect for either of the two dummies. This is the case for both
the benchmark model (OLS) and all the sensitivity analyses performed in terms of model
specification and sample perturbations.
Subramanian and Wei (2007) distinguish between three ”asymmetries” that Rose
overlooked. These were the distinction between industrial and developing economies,
before and after the Uruguay round and between different product sectors. These authors
also account for the multilateral resistance term to avoid any potential omitted variable
bias as shown in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). This term was not included in
Rose (2004a). These authors find the WTO to have a positive effect on imports for
industrialized countries, so they concluded that the WTO trade effect was uneven across
countries and sectors.
Tomz et al. (2003) use Rose’s dataset but define the WTO dummy in a different
way. The authors argue that three categories of non-member participants like colonies,
de facto members, and provisional members should be included among the countries that
benefit from the rights and obligations of the WTO. Once they include these categories
in the definition of the WTO dummy, their analysis leads them to find a positive effect
of WTO membership on trade flows. This is the case for every sensitivity test performed
along similar lines to those in Rose’s work.
Chang and Lee (2007), use non parametric techniques to assess the effect of the
WTO on trade flows. They use the same data as in Rose (2004a) and different matching
estimators in their analysis to uncover the effect of WTO membership on trade flows.
Their result is in contrast with Rose’s findings. Their finding is a trade boosting effect
of WTO membership regardless of the estimator used.
Herz and Wagner (2007) use aggregate data for 147 countries for the years 1962-1999.
They define the WTO dummy as in Tomz et al. (2003) and they also use FE estimation.
They find a positive and significant effect for joint WTO membership but also a positive
effect if only the importer of the pair is a WTO member. They find that this effect
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is robust even when other institutions as RTA, currency unions and GSP system are
considered.
Eicher and Henn (2008) use aggregate import data and try to bring together the
studies of Rose (2004a), Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Tomz et al. (2003) to rec-
oncile their conflicting results. The authors consider a gravity model as used in these
studies. They control for individual RTA effects as in Rose and multilateral resistance
as in Subramanian and Wei (2007) by introducing time varying importer and exporter
fixed effects. They argue that unobserved heterogeneity should also be considered by
including country pair fixed effects, otherwise any reported coefficients would be inflated.
They consider different ways to code the WTO and RTA dummies. For all the different
cases considered, the authors find that once unobserved heterogeneity is considered all
the studies would lead to an insignificant effect of the WTO on imports.
The above studies are based on aggregate trade data to assess the WTO effects on
trade. Recent literature has focused on the effects of trade liberalization on two trade
margins: the extensive and the intensive margin. Hummels and Klenow (2002) is the first
study to decompose trade growth in the two margins and study the nature of exports
from large economies compared to those of smaller ones. There are recent studies that
have indicated the important role of the extensive margin in trade growth (Felbermayr
and Kohler, 2006, Hilberry, 2002, Amiti and Freund, 2008). Some studies examine the
effect of trade barrier (tariff) reductions on the trade margins (Persson, 2008, Debaere and
Mostabari, 2007, Camberoni et al., 2008, Manchin, 2004). Finally, there is empirical work
on the effects of regional trade agreement or currency union participation on the trade
margins (Kehoe and Ruhl, 2003, Baldwin and Di-Nino, 2006, Flam and Nordstrom, 2006,
Romalis, 2005, De Nardis et al., 2008, Berthou and Fontagne, 2008, Amurgo Pacheco,
2006, Amurgo Pacheco and Pierola, 2007).
The current study is mostly related to this last group of studies in the sense that
disaggregated data are used to study not only the effects of regional trade agreements,
but also the effect of WTO membership. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two
studies that have attempted to analyze the trade effects of WTO membership on both
margins. But both of these studies rely on aggregated data and they take advantage
of zero trade flows between country pairs that become positive at some point in the
period of study. With aggregated data, the only way to capture changes in the extensive
margin is in the cases where trade between a country A and a country B was zero and
at some point in time becomes positive. But an increase in the extensive margin might
be realized not only because there is a new destination with which one country trades.
It can be the case that countries A and B trade in some product categories, whereas
trade in some other categories is zero. Suppose there are n product categories in which
countries A and B could potentially trade, but there is positive trade in a subset m of
these categories. So n-m categories are inactive. If there is an increase in the number of
product categories traded say m+1, then this extra product traded should be counted as
well in the extensive margin. This could be captured only in the case that disaggregated
data are used, whereas this seems not to be the case in the studies that rely on aggregate
data.
The first of these studies is the one by Felbermayr and Kohler (2007). The authors
try to correct the weaknesses of previous literature (Rose, 2004a) that finds no significant
effect of WTO membership on trade flows among members. The authors mainly argue
that previous estimates suffer from downward bias since these analyses ignore the zero
trade flows present in the data. Therefore, the authors exploit the information in the
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zero trade through a Tobit estimation to uncover a positive effect of WTO membership
mainly through the extensive margin of trade. The authors use annual data from the
IMF DOTS for 104 countries for the years 1965-2004. The authors employ a gravity
model using as explanatory variables, a dummy variables for whether both countries
or one of the countries in the country pair are members of the WTO, a dummy for
FTA, distance, common language and adjacency. The authors also include importer
and exporter time varying fixed effects. In that way they account for multilateral trade
resistance as outlined in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). They also account for
country unobserved heterogeneity that might affect the decision to join the WTO (factors
that might be correlated with the WTO dummy). The authors perform cross sectional
OLS, probit and Tobit estimation and find no effect for WTO membership. Once they
exploit the time series dimension of the data and time varying fixed effects, the authors
find a positive and significant effect of WTO membership in all estimations i.e. OLS with
strictly positive trade flows (intensive margin), probit (extensive margin) and the tobit
(both margins).
The second study by Liu (2009) also examines the effects of WTO membership on
both trade margins. The data are from the IMF DOTS, the World Trade Flows and the
World export data for the period 1948-2003, for 210 countries. The estimation techniques
used are a Tobit model and Poisson regression to account for the potential violation of
normality and homoskedasticity under the Tobit estimation. The author estimates a
gravity model including dummies for WTO membership, common border, landlocked,
common language, common religion, colonial relationship, common colonizer, RTA mem-
bership, GSP status, CU membership. Moreover, GDP and GDP per capita for countries,
distance, areas, remoteness, military conflict and formal alliance dummy, time effects and
country pair effects are included in the estimated equation. The main findings are that
WTO membership promotes both overall trade and the creation of new trading relation-
ships through the extensive margins, after controlling for the zero trade flows (sample
selection bias) and the presence of heteroskedasticity not captured by the log-linear grav-
ity model (gravity model specification).
The theoretical grounds for the intensive and extensive margins of trade were set by
Chaney (2008). In his model he includes heterogeneous firms in terms of productivity and
a fixed cost for exporting. If trade barriers are lower, then new and less productive firms
enter the market. If the elasticity of substitution between goods is high, low productivity
firms have a disadvantage, they cannot set high prices and they capture only a small
market share. The effect on aggregate trade is small and the intensive margin turns out
to be more sensitive when compared to the extensive margin to trade barriers. If the
elasticity of substitution is low (more differentiated goods), then new firms can charge a
higher price and get a higher market share. The effect on aggregate trade is large and
the extensive margin is now more sensitive to changes in the trade barriers compared to
the intensive margin. Chaney also shows that reductions in the variable cost increase the
volume of trade in existing firms (intensive margin) and the number of new exporters
(extensive margin). He also shows that reductions in fixed cost affect only the number of
new exporters. In Section 5.2 we test the theoretical predictions of Chaney.
In the current study disaggregated data are used and measures for the intensive and
extensive margins of trade are constructed. More specifically, the number of product
categories traded between a pair of countries in a given year and the trade volume per
product are used to define the extensive and intensive margins respectively. Moreover,
more appropriate estimation methods recently proposed in the literature are used to
7
assess the trade effect of WTO membership. These are the methods proposed by Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Additionally, we include an extensive section of heterogeneity
analysis, where the WTO effect is decomposed by country groups, by sectors and by
degree of product differentiation. While the last one has already received some attention
using disaggregated data, the first two parts of the heterogeneity analysis are conducted
mainly by Subramanian and Wei (2007) and use aggregated data. Our purpose is to
analyze these parts using disaggregated data and their effects on the extensive margin.
Finally, we present how results change by including time varying exporter and importer
fixed effects, to account for the multilateral resistance term, as in Subramanian and Wei
(2007), Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) and Eicher and Henn (2008). The next section
presents the data sources, the specification used and the reasons why we choose the
proposed estimation method.
3 Empirical model, Data and Estimation Method
3.1 Empirical Model
In the current study we make use of the gravity model of trade flows to estimate the effects
of the WTO and RTA membership as in Rose (2004a) and the other studies outlined in
the previous section. Following the literature on gravity models of trade unilateral trade
flows are estimated as a function of economic mass and bilateral distance:
V = α0Y
α1
i Y
α2
j D
α3
ij ηij (1)
Rose (2004a) estimated in log linear form the following gravity model by OLS:
ln(Tijt) = β0 + β1Oneinijt + β2Bothinijt + β3GSPijt + β4RTAijt +
β5CUijt + β6lnDij + β7ln(GDPitGDPjt) +
β8ln(GDPitGDPjt/PopitPopjt) + β9Langij + β10Contij +
β11Landlij + β12Islandij + β13ln(AreaiAreaj) +
β14ComColij + β15CurColijt + β16Colonyij +
β17ComNatij +
∑
θtTimeDummies+ ijt (2)
where Tijt is the average value of real bilateral trade between country i and country j at
time t. The rest of the variables are as defined in Table 4.2 below. We use this benchmark
model to replicate initially Rose’s result, by using our data. Later on, Tijt is constructed
using only the export data from country i to country j at time t. Using this benchmark
model time effects are included in the model and OLS estimation is performed by using
the robust standard errors option.
Then we use export data to decompose trade in the two margins to study the effects
of WTO membership. In that case we will have to estimate the following set of three
equations, assuming the following specification for the mean:
8
V = exp(β0 + β1Oneinijt + β2Bothinijt + β3GSPijt + β4RTAijt +
β5RTAoneinijt + β6CUijt + β7ln(GDPit) + β8ln(GDPjt) +
β9ln(GDP/cap.)it + β10ln(GDP/cap.)jt + β11CurColijt +∑
θtTimeDummies+
∑
φtCountryPairDummies+ ijt) (3)
where V=[Xijt, Xijt/Nijt, Nijt] is a 1 by 3 vector of our dependent variables used in the
Poisson regressions. The log of these variables i.e. V=[ln(Xijt), ln(Xijt/Nijt), ln(Nijt)]
is used in the OLS in the Appendix.
In the equation above, Xijt is the aggregate bilateral exports (i.e. which is total
export flows for all products at a given year for a given pair), Xijt/Nijt is the average
export volume (intensive margin) and Nijt is the number of products exported per year
per country pair (extensive margin). This decomposition was adopted by Flam and
Nordstrom (2004), Bernard et al. (2004), Nitsch and Pisu (2008) as well. Adding up the
effects on the two margins should yield the total effect on aggregate exports (this is the
case in the log linear model, Poisson is a non linear model so this will not be the case).
This is because the dependent variable Xijt is decomposed as follows:
Xijt = Nijt ∗ (Xijt/Nijt) (4)
And in logs: 4
ln(Xijt) = ln(Nijt) + ln(Xijt/Nijt) (7)
Finally, some of the time invariant country pair specific variables like distance, common
border etc., that appear in Equation (2) are not estimated in Equation (3). This is because
in Equation (3) we have included country pair dummies that account for the effects of
these variables and other country pair time invariant effects (unobserved heterogeneity).
This is similar to the approach of Eicher and Henn (2008).
3.2 Data
The trade data used in this study are taken from the UN Comtrade. These are disag-
gregated data at the 4 and 5-digit level of the SITC revision 1 classification. The time
span covers the years from 1962 to 2007. The choice was made to have the longest time
series dimension and the finest disaggregation possible to capture as best as possible de-
velopments in the number of products traded between country pairs. The categories of
products covered by this classification are shown in Table 4.1. These categories are more
consistently represented in the case of the 4-digit data. The 5-digit data mainly represent
categories 6 to 9. The sample of countries used is the same as in Rose (2004) with the
exception of Reunion for which no disaggregated trade data were available.
4The OLS estimator is given by:
βˆ = (X ′X)−1(X ′Y ) (5)
Y in our case is ln(Xijt) which is the sum of ln(Nijt) and ln(Xijt/Nijt). Setting ln(Nijt) equal to Z and
ln(Xijt/Nijt) equal to W, βˆ is the sum of two other effects γˆz and γˆw:
βˆ = (X ′X)−1(X ′Y ) = (X ′X)−1(X ′(Z +W )) = (X ′X)−1(X ′Z) + (X ′X)−1(X ′W ) = γˆz + γˆw (6)
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Table 1: SITC Revision 1 Product Categories
Product category SITC Code
Food and Live Animals 0
Beverages and Tobacco 1
Crude Materials 2
Mineral, Fuels, Lubricants and Related Material 3
Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats 4
Chemicals and Related Products 5
Manufacturing and Goods 6
Machinery and Transport Equipment 7
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Articles 8
Commodities and Transactions not classified elsewhere in SITC 9
These data are aggregated initially to construct the same dependent variable as in
Rose (2004a) to compare our results on the aggregate level with his results using our
data. Later we consider unilateral flows from country i to country j and we construct a
dependent variable based only on exports. The problem with trade data is that reported
exports from country i to country j are not usually equal to the imports reported by
country j from country i. For each export flow we either have two reported values (one
from the exporter and one from the importer) or either only one reported value (from
the exporter). We treat the first case by taking a simple average of the two reported
numbers of the same flow. We also take a weighted average of each reported flow using
as weights the share of real GDP per capita over both countries’ sum of GDP per capita.
The rationale behind this weighting is that richer countries tend to have a higher quality
in their reporting data compared to poorer countries. For the cases in which only one
number is reported for the export flow we use this number to represent the export figure
for that year between the two countries. Another issue is related to how we treat the
flows that were zero between a country pair in a given year. UN Comtrade, that is the
source of our trade data, does not report the zeros but omits the product lines for which
there is no trade in one year. We create the zeros in a similar way as in Baldwin and Di
Nino (2006), by recovering the zeros in a nation by nation fashion. So if one country of
our 177 countries did not trade a product at all for any year with any of the other 176
partners, we exclude those types of zero trade flows from our database. It is like applying
a comparative advantage argument: if some products were never traded between two
countries it might be because of lack of factors of production or technology level for that
product in the two countries. Zero flows account for more than 55% in our dataset.
We then decompose total exports in the two margins: the number of product cate-
gories per country pair in a given year (extensive margin) and the average export volume
per product category in a given year. We follow the decomposition the way it was re-
cently used in Bernard et al. (2004) and Nitsch and Pisu (2008). For the extensive
margin we use the number of product categories between a country pair in a given year
t. For the intensive margins we use the average sales per product between a country pair
in a given year t. Changes in the number of products and average sales from year to
year will indicate whether or not these changes are at all related to the WTO and RTAs
membership. We are aware that these two measures of the extensive and the intensive
margins can only capture the developments in each margin imperfectly. To be able to
capture the exact change in the extensive margin we would need to have product level
data at the firm level. Since such data are not currently available, the best we can do is
to use the 4-digit and 5-digit data. Within each of these product categories exists a range
of individual goods, so we can not isolate the full extensive margin. It is not possible
10
to capture cases in which the WTO causes more products to be traded in a 4-digit or a
5-digit category if that category has positive trade flows. We are able to identify cases
where a 4-digit or a 5-digit category had zero trade and in a year becomes positive, since
all the sub categories within that category were all zero. Therefore, we cannot capture
the full effect of the WTO on the extensive margin as we know that within a category
with positive trade there are others for which we do not know if trade is really positive
or zero. Because of this data limitation, some developments in the intensive margin are
likely to capture some of the WTO effect on the extensive margin. This was also pointed
out by Baldwin and Di Nino (2006) and Flam and Nordstrom (2006).
In the first set of regressions where we try to replicate Rose’s result, we take data for
the independent variables from Rose’s website. We are actually using exactly the same
data he used in his study for the years and countries common to our dataset and his. So
the first set of regressions includes our dependent variable based on our data and Rose’s
independent variables for that part of his sample which overlaps with our sample.
Once we replicate Rose’s main result, we construct our set of independent variables
based on other sources. The reason is that Rose’s dataset only goes up to 1999 and we
needed to have a comprehensive dataset up to 2007. The regressors employed in this
study are the same ones used in Rose and are listed in Table 4.2.
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Table 2: List of Variables
Variable Name Description
Bothinijt* Dummy equal to 1 if i and j are members of the GATT/ WTO in year t.
5
Oneinijt* Dummy equal 1 if i or j is a member of the GATT/ WTO in year t.
RTAijt* Dummy equal to 1 if i and j are members of a regional trade agreement in year t.
6
RTAoneinijt Dummy equal to 1 if i or j is a member of a regional trade agreement in year t.
(CU)ijt* Dummy equal to 1 if i and j are members of a currency union in year t.
7
lnDij* The natural log of bilateral distance.
ln(GDPi ∗GDPj)* The natural log of the product of i’s and j’s real GDP in year t.
ln(GDPi) The natural log of i’s real GDP in year t.
ln(GDPi) The natural log of j’s real GDP in year t.
ln(GDPi ∗GDPj/PopiPopj)* The natural log of the product of i’s and j’s real GDP per capita in year t.
ln(GDP/cap.)i The natural log of i’s real GDP per capita in year t.
ln(GDP/cap.)j The natural log of j’s real GDP per capita in year t.
GSPijt* Dummy equal to 1 if j is a GSP beneficiary of i in year t.
Contij* Dummy equal to 1 if i and j share a common border.
Langij* Dummy equal to 1 if i and j share a common language.
Landlij* Indicator equal to 0, 1, 2 if none, one or both i and j are landlocked.
Landlockedij* Dummy equal to 1, if at least one of the countries or both are landlocked.
Islandij* Indicator equal to 0, 1, 2 if none, one or both i and j are islands (in Equation 4.2).
this variable is 1 if at least one of the countries or both are islands (in Section 4.6.4).
ln(Areai ∗ Areaj)* The natural log of the product of i’s and j’s area.
ComColij* Dummy equal to 1 if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with same colonizer.
CurColijt* Dummy equal to 1 if i is a colony of j in year t or vice versa.
Colonyij* Dummy equal to 1 if i was ever a colony of j or vice versa.
ComNatij* Dummy equal to 1 if i and j remained part of the same nation during the sample.
* indicates that the data were taken from Rose’s website refering to his 2004a paper.
Data on the variables lnDij, Contij, Langij, Landlij, Islandij, ln(Areai ∗ Areaj),
ComColij, CurColij, Colonyij, ComNatij are provided from Rose for the replication
regressions and the additional data are from CEPII for the rest of the regressions.
In the regression where only export data are used we consider the natural log of each
country’s GDP separately (ln(GDPi) and ln(GDPj) respectively) and we get data from
the World Bank, the IMF and the UN. All GDP data are converted using the base year
1995 and when the datasets involve missing values we use the method of splining to
fill in with comparable GDP values from the other datasets. The exchange rate series
used in case we needed to convert data to US dollars were taken from the World Bank.
To calculate (ln(GDP/cap.)i) and ln(GDP/cap.)j), we divided real GDP as described
above with total population. Data on population were taken from the World Bank and
in cases with missing values from the IMF and the UN. These data are also used in the
construction of the weighted dependent variables described above.
The dummy (GSPijt) was constructed with information collected from the UNCTAD
website and from TRAINS. To be in a position to construct this variable correctly we
need the list of beneficiaries for each country that granted preferences for every year.
Such a dataset to the best of our knowledge does not exist so we base the construction
on the years found in the lists of UNCTAD and TRAINS. If a country appears to be a
beneficiary in every year of the years that are available, we assume that it has been a
beneficiary for all of those years from the beginning when the preferences started to be
granted from the part of the preference giving country. We set the variable to zero for
every case where we have evidence that it was not a beneficiary for a given year according
to the sources above. This is an imperfect measure of GSP.8
5A list of the countries and year of accession in GATT/WTO is given in Appendix B.
6The data for the WTO dummies and the RTA dummies are taken as well from the WTO website.
A do file with the way the RTA and RTAonein dummies are constructed is available upon request. A
list with the countries and year of joining each RTA is given in the Appendix B.
7We supplement Rose’s data with information from Wikipedia. A do file with the way the CU dummy
is constructed is available upon request.
8A do file with the way the GSP dummy is constructed is available upon request.
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3.3 Estimation Method
As already mentioned in the literature review, some authors consider two additional is-
sues that could bias the WTO estimates. One is to control for the multilateral resistance
term as outlined in Anderson and Wincoop (2003). This form of omitted variable bias
has its theoretical foundation on the model by Anderson and Wincoop (2003). Usually
authors use time varying importer and exporter fixed effects to capture the multilateral
resistance term. This is the case in Subramanian and Wei (2007), Felbermayr and Kohler
(2007) and Eicher and Henn (2008). In the regressions with time varying importer and
exporter fixed effects a subsample of the years available is used, as these regressions are
computationally infeasible with the full sample of years.9 The second issue is that of
unobserved heterogeneity. If the controls in the gravity models above cannot capture
differences in trade patterns due to unobserved factors that affect both the WTO mem-
bership and trade flows then the coefficients will be biased as well. This is more an
empirical observation, without any theoretical foundation like the multilateral resistance
term discussed above. Eicher and Henn (2008) use country pair fixed effect to account
for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity. We will introduce in the analysis, country
pair fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity and all our regressions, apart
from the ones introducing the multilateral resistance terms, contain country pair FE.
Recent work by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) stresses the drawbacks of log lin-
earizing the gravity specification and then applying OLS estimation on the linearized
model. The problem arises as the expected value of the error term in the log linearized
gravity equation is a function of the higher moments of its distribution. These moments
are likely to depend on the regressors of the gravity model, which creates a bias problem
in the estimated elasticities in the log linearized model. The authors show that this is the
case both for the traditional gravity equations and the one proposed by Anderson and
Wincoop (2003), where the inclusion of fixed effects to account for multilateral resistance
is not enough to overcome this bias. Moreover, the authors point out the problem one
faces, related to missing trade or zero trade values, when trying to estimate a log linear
model. A log linear model ignores all the observations for which trade is zero. In our
dataset more than 55% of our observations are zero. This is one of the main reasons
for assuming the particular specification for the mean in Equation (4.3) above. There-
fore, the multiplicative not the linear version of the gravity model is more appropriate to
use. The authors propose a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator and
perform a simulation study which reveals that the proposed estimator should be used
instead of the widely used OLS and Tobit, when different forms of heteroskedasticity
are considered. Then they apply this estimator to the gravity model and find that the
coefficients are smaller in magnitude and some of them lose the conventional significance
when a traditional log-linearized model is estimated.
For the reasons outlined in the Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) study, we perform
all the regressions using the proposed PPML estimator. The PPML estimator will be
our preferred among all the results presented in the current study and will be presented
9The number of observations in our dataset is around a million in the Poisson Regression. With time
varying importer and exporter fixed effects we need an additional number of dummies equal to 177*45*2
(number of countries*number of years*2(for importer and exporter)). By keeping one year every four
years in the dataset we reduce the number of observations to 271374 (see Table 4.8) and needing only an
additional number of 177*14*2 dummies, computations seem more feasible. Constraints on computing
make the choice of one year every three years, every two years or the whole dataset infeasible. For this
reason, one every four years was the biggest dataset that our computer could handle.
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in the main body of the paper. The OLS results are included in the Appendix for the
interested reader to refer to.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Replication Regressions
In this section we analyze the main results of this study and we compare them with
those found in other studies. Table 3 shows the regression results that replicate the
findings in Rose (2004a). Column 1 in Table 3 just represents the Benchmark model
as in Rose (2004a). We are interested in the coefficients on the first two variables i.e.
whether both countries or just one of the two are members in the WTO. In Column
1, the trade effect of WTO is insignificant. Column 2 shows the effects that Rose’s
data would indicate if we limit the sample of years and countries to that overlapping
with our sample. Again the effects on both variables of interest remain insignificant.
Column 3, is the same model as in the first two columns with the difference that the
dependent variable is the one constructed in the same way as in Rose but using our
4-digit disaggregated data, aggregated for each country pair per year. The rest of the
independent variables are the ones used in Rose and the estimation is performed for the
overlapping sample as in Column 2. The coefficients on the two WTO dummies are
positive but remain insignificant. This indicates that our aggregated data can replicate
Rose’s result. In Column 4 the dependent variable is constructed by using the weighted
4-digit disaggregated trade data, aggregated for each country pair per year. The weights
used are shares of GDP per capita over the sum of the GDP per capita for each country
pair, averaged over all the available years for each pair. The effects are again insignificant
in line with Rose. The last three columns repeat the same exercise as in Columns 2, 3 and
4, but using the 5-digit disaggregated data for the dependent variable, aggregated for each
country pair per year. The variables of interest i.e. the WTO membership and unilateral
WTO membership remain insignificant. Therefore, on the aggregate there is no evidence
of WTO trade boosting effect between members (Both Countries in GATT/WTO) or
trade diversion between members and non members (One country in GATT/WTO). The
rest of the gravity regressors have the expected signs and the gravity model explains two
thirds of the variation in actual log trade flows in each case.
4.2 The WTO and the trade margins
After establishing the ability of our data to replicate Rose’s result on the aggregate, we
decompose trade in the two margins and perform the same kind of regression to uncover
any potential effects of WTO membership through the two trade margins. The regressions
from Table 4 and onwards differ in the following ways from those in Table 3. Firstly, now
the aggregate trade is constructed using only export data. The reason for this is, first of
all, that the theory of the gravity model was established for unidirectional trade flows.
The other reason is that since we want to capture changes in the extensive margin, we
need to consider the fact that the number and kind of products exported from country
i to country j is in some cases different from that exported from country j to country i.
Since the number of products is now one of the dependent variables we need to consider
this factor. Secondly, since we consider unilateral trade, we split the variables like real
GDP and real GDP per capita. In other words, now we have one variable for each of the
14
two countries in each country pair distinguishing between exporter and importer. The
reason is because of the way we define now the dependent variables and also to capture
differential effects for the importer and the exporter. Finally, we use additional data
from the CEPII to construct the gravity variables and make sure that we have the largest
possible sample for these variables matching the trade observations. In the rest of the
analysis we report results on Poisson with time fixed effects, country pair fixed effects
and robust standard errors. Those results are the ones where the 5-digit weighted data
were used. Poisson results and OLS using 4-digit data and 5-digit unweighted data are
presented in Appendix A for the interested reader.
Table 4.4 shows the results for the 5-digit weighted data using Poisson. The first two
rows show the effects of WTO on each margin between members and between members
and non-members. On the aggregate, there is a positive and significant WTO effect.
This is not in line with Rose, who found no significant WTO effect. There is a positive
effect on average sales and a positive effect on the extensive margin, between the member
countries. Considering the trade effects between members and non-members there is a
trade creating effect (the coefficients on the One WTO members variable are positive and
significant in total trade and the two margins in row 2).
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Considering the other trade arrangements like RTA and GSP, GSP seems to affect
positively aggregate exports. The RTA membership seems to affect positively aggregate
exports and average sales, while the number of products traded is affected only between
members and non-members. In Table 4, the RESET test reveals that the specification
seems to be valid for the aggregate exports and average sales (probability in Column 1
and 2 is 0.11 and 0.25 respectively). The test suggests that the model works better in the
case of aggregate trade but it fails to do so for the extensive margin regressions.10 These
results are robust with those in Table 9 in the Appendix. Table 4.10 presents the OLS
results. This positive effect is present even when we account for unobserved heterogeneity
in Table 4.10 with simple OLS (in the case of the 4-digit data this is the case only for
the extensive margin). The OLS results reveal that redefining the dependent variable as
unilateral trade, as the gravity model theory suggests, is enough to uncover a positive
WTO effect, following the same analysis as in Rose (2004a). There are no so robust
evidence of trade creation or diversion as in Table 4. The OLS regressions fail to satisfy
the RESET test (p-values are zero for these models).
The most robust results from the analysis carried out so far is that the WTO tends
to foster trade through increasing the number of new products traded among members
(extensive margin). This result is in line with Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) and Liu
(2009). Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) found a positive effect also on the aggregate and
the intensive margin. The difference is that they used a Tobit Model for the estimation
and use aggregate trade data. We create explicit measures for the margins and perform
Poisson estimation that Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) provided evidence that works
better than OLS and Tobit in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Liu uses again aggregate
data and Tobit. Also Poisson is used in that analysis, but the author considers the zeros
in the trade matrix and not an explicit measure for the extensive margin as we do. An
additional difference with the current study is that by using disaggregated data allows
us to capture the extensive margin not only in the case that trade between two countries
becomes at some time from zero positive. This is feasible with aggregate data. With
disaggregated data we can capture as the extensive margin cases where two countries
already trade at some product lines but not at some others. If there is new trade in some
of those inactive product lines, this will be captured by our measure of extensive margin,
whereas this seems not to be the case in the above two studies that rely on aggregate
data.
10While the model for aggregate exports passes the RESET test, it is not expected that this should
be the case for the average exports and for the number of product categories. The number of product
categories is an imperfect proxy for the true number of products traded. With the classification used in
the current study, we can capture at most 918 product categories at the 5-digit level. This upper limit is
likely to be achieved when trade takes place between developed economies. If this is the case the function
that describes the model for the extensive margin should be s-shaped rather than the exponential. This
could explain why this model for the number of product categories fails the RESET test. Also, there is
no theoretical support for the average sales per category to be modelled as a gravity equation. Despite
the potential misspecification of these models, and since more appropriate specifications are not currently
available, we follow the previous literature (Flam and Nordstrom, 2004, Bernard et al., 2004, Nitsch and
Pisu, 2008) and use gravity models both for the number of categories and for the average exports per
category.
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Table 4: WTO and the Trade Margins (5 digit data)-Poisson Regression
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both WTO members 0.731*** 0.419* 0.292***
One WTO members 0.472*** 0.511** 0.207***
RTA 0.315*** 0.581*** -0.013
One in RTA -0.059 -0.167 0.124***
GSP 0.190* 0.256 -0.093***
CU -0.029 0.126 -0.136***
GDP exporter 0.334*** -0.823*** 0.970***
GDP importer 0.348*** -0.420** 0.675***
GDP/cap. exporter 0.732*** 1.181*** -0.393***
GDP/cap. importer 0.794*** 1.261*** -0.434***
Current Colony 0.313*** -0.145 0.268**
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No
Number of Obs 964173 964173 964173
RESET test 0.11 0.25 0.00
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Poisson regression, robust standard errors
clustered by country pair are included, Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports
using 5 digit weighted data, Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using
5 digit weighted data,Column 3: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number
of products) using 5 digit weighted data,Figures next to RESET test are the
p-values for the test for the model in each column.
A second important finding is that the WTO effect on the intensive margin is positive
and significant at the 5-digit, but is insignificant at the 4-digit data (Table 9). This
result is in line with most of the results appearing in the empirical literature that find
a positive effect or no effect for WTO membership. This evidence can be backed up by
the observation that once trade costs are reduced through trade liberalization, then more
firms start exporting. These could be (marginally) relatively less productive firms, that
after a slight decrease in the costs of entry to a new market start exporting. However,
they mainly export new products and the quantities sold might be so small that they are
not able to affect overall and average trade volumes very much. On top of that, there are
competition effects as more firms in the same market will drive the price, and possibly the
market shares of the average firm, down. On the other hand, there is empirical evidence
at the firm level that trade liberalization leads to a reallocation of resources from low
to high productivity firms (Bernard et al., 2007). Low productivity and inefficient firms
exit the market and new more productive firms enter the market. Also there is evidence
that the more productive firms have the ability to retain high profits, even if the mark
ups fall due to an increase in competition (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2003). From all these
arguments it is difficult to foresee which effect will dominate and explain the positive
effect on average sales, but the explanation about more productive firms surviving and
increasing their volume of trade over time seems to be the one supported partially by our
data (in Table 4).
Perhaps a plausible explanation for the absence of a WTO effect on average sales
is the one offered by Albornoz et al. (2009) about the fact that exporting firms start
by selling small quantities to their neighbours because they are uncertain about their
performance as exporters. Entering a foreign market involves incurring an entry sunk
cost and since firms are uncertain about their future profitability, they prefer to export to
near markets where the entry cost is small, and experiment by exporting small quantities.
After their profitability is revealed then the exporters either exit the market or increase
their volumes not only in the current but also in new destinations as now they have
gained knowledge about their performance as exporters. Considering these arguments,
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after a trade liberalization episode (decrease of entry costs) many new firms enter new
destinations (which has a positive effect on the extensive margin). However, if those
new exporters are uncertain about their performance, they will start by selling small
quantities, bringing down the average sales per product (which has a negative effect on
the intensive margin). Albornoz et al. (2009) provide evidence that new exporters are
more likely to enter a new market than experienced ones. These new exporters will more
likely experiment as the experienced ones already have knowledge of their performance
and will have entered all possible markets. Moreover, the behaviour of more productive
exporters is such that they tend to make larger first period profits, they tend to sell
larger volume abroad and they are less likely to exit a market. These arguments provide
a possible explanation for the effects on the two margins as discussed above.
This mechanical effect that results from the behaviour of small new exporters can be
supported by our data. Figures 1 and 2 below show the evolution of average sales for
new versus old products. As old we define a product in two ways. Old is a product that
was traded between a country pair the previous year or the previous five years. Once we
separate the products in the above way we calculate the average trade on each product
category for each year. The results are shown in the two graphs below. In both cases,
average trade in old products is higher than average trade in new products. The figures
confirm the scenario of new exporters’ selling small quantities and old exporters selling
large quantities.
Finally, the results also offer an explanation for the insignificant overall effect in Rose
(2004a). We also found evidence of no aggregate trade effects when we use OLS as
in Rose (Table 3). Table 10 in Appendix A shows the OLS results when we redefined
the dependent variable using unilateral trade flows (exports) and uncovered a positive
effect on aggregate trade and the extensive margin at the 5-digit level of data. Table 4.4
uses the new dependent variable (based on unilateral exports) and Poisson Regression (to
include the zero trade flows and to account for the bias created by using OLS) to deliver a
positive and significant effect both for aggregate trade and the trade margins. Therefore,
one should be really careful when interpreting the aggregate results of the WTO studies
conducted so far, in the sense that if we really do want to employ the gravity model, this
has to be done using unilateral trade flows according to the theory. Table 4.9 shows as well
that redefining the dependent variable using only export data, as the theory indicates,
and using PPML reveal a positive WTO trade effect on the aggregate.
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Figure 1: Average Trade in new versus old products (1 year)
5 Heterogeneity Analysis
After establishing the results from the basic regressions, we perform a series of checks to
identify the WTO effect per country group, per degree of product differentiation and per
sector.
5.1 The WTO effect and the level of development
It is well known that the liberalization requirements for WTO members are different
between developed and developing economies. Developed economies have reduced tariffs
from 15% to around 4% on average. On the other hand, developing economies have
reduced tariffs to only one third of their export lines and the tariff rates imposed by the
WTO were usually much higher than the applied ones (Subramanian and Wei, 2007).
Does such a differential treatment play a role on trade?
To answer this question, Table 5 introduces dummies that split the WTO effect be-
tween industrial and developing countries. The distinction is based on the method used
by Subramanian and Wei (2007).11 The dummy variable taking value 1 if both countries
were members in the WTO is replaced by four dummies: the first one is a dummy that
takes value 1 if both countries are industrial countries and both members of the WTO in
a given year. The second dummy takes value 1 if the importer is an industrial country
and the exporter is a developing one and both are WTO members in a given year. The
11We separate the countries in developed and developing based on Table 2 in the Appendix of the
NBER Working Paper version of the Subramanian and Wei paper (NBER Working Paper 10024). We
understand that there are other ways to split the countries into developed and developing. We follow
Subramanian and Wei to be able to compare our results with their results.
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Figure 2: Average Trade in new versus old products (5 year)
third dummy takes value 1 if the importer is a developing country, the exporter is indus-
trial and both the importer and exporter are WTO members. Finally, the last dummy
will be 1 if both WTO members are developing economies. Subramanian and Wei (2007)
indicated that the WTO effect should be higher for the first of these dummies and then
decline for the rest of the dummies. Moreover, we have split the unilateral WTO mem-
bership dummy into the four following dummies: firstly, a dummy that takes value 1 if
the importer is industrial and a WTO member but the exporter is not in the WTO. Sec-
ondly, a dummy that takes value 1 if the importer is a developing WTO country member
but the exporter is not in the WTO. A third dummy that is 1 if the exporter is industrial
and a WTO member and the importer is not a WTO member. Finally, a dummy equal
to 1 if the exporter is developing and a WTO member and the importer is not a WTO
member.
Table 4.5 represents the Poisson results for the above analysis. Focusing on the first
four rows, WTO seems to affect positively aggregate exports for every combination of
exporter-importer country members. This effect is highest when both WTO members
are industrial countries. This is in line with Subramanian and Wei (2007). When the
importer country member is industrial and the exporter is developing, the effect is also
high, implying that the WTO affects positively exports from developing economies to
industrial importers. There is a positive and significant WTO effect on average sales for
all the cases apart from the case of a developing WTO country pair. In this case, the effect
on the extensive margin is positive and significant. The WTO extensive margin effect
is negative and significant for industrial pairs and insignificant for the other two cases
(Rows 2 and 3 Column 3 of Table 4.5). Regarding the trade creation/diversion dummies,
WTO seems to promote trade with outsiders through total exports and average sales
only in the case where the importer is industrial or a developing WTO member and the
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exporter is not a WTO member. The number of products traded between members and
non-members tends to increase when the exporter member in the pair is a developing
country. The RESET test seems to promote only the specification for total exports and
average sales. In that case total exports mostly benefit predominantly when the two
members are industrial countries followed by the case where the importer is an industrial
country and the exporter is a developing country. Moreover, the largest trade creating
effect appears in the case where the importer is an industrial WTO member.
This evidence supports only partially the evidence by Subramanian and Wei (2007)
that the WTO effect is present mainly in the industrial country pairs. Our results indicate
that membership can benefit trade between developing economies, at least through the
extensive margin and aggregate trade. The positive effect on aggregate exports and
average sales between members that are industrial-developing indicates that the WTO
could benefit trade in the North-South trading case. Finally, the extensive margin is
harmed in the case of industrial WTO members. The results in Table 4.11 are similar.
The only difference is that in the 4-digit data case, there is no WTO effect on aggregate
exports except in the case where both WTO members are developing countries. There
is no trade creation effect between industrial and WTO importer members and a non-
member WTO exporter. The OLS results in Table 4.12 confirm the Subramanian and Wei
(2007) predictions on the aggregate only for the 5-digit level data, but those regressions
fail the RESET test even if they include country pair FE. From those results the extensive
margin is positively affected only in the case of two developing WTO members.
22
Table 5: The WTO Effect by Country group(5 digit data)
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both Industrial and WTO 1.191*** 3.209*** -0.265***
Importer Industrial, Exporter Developing and both WTO 0.952*** 2.458*** -0.021
Importer Developing, Exporter Industrial and both WTO 0.561*** 0.718** -0.052
Both Developing and WTO 0.674*** 0.293 0.535***
Importer Industrial and WTO, Exporter not in WTO 0.855*** 2.991*** -0.304***
Importer Developing and WTO, Exporter not in WTO 0.799*** 0.841*** 0.024
Exporter Industrial and WTO, Importer not in WTO -0.014 -0.471 0.072
Exporter Developing and WTO, Importer not in WTO 0.098 -1.014** 0.336***
RTA 0.311*** 0.502** -0.045
One in RTA -0.045 -0.072 0.111***
GSP -0.002 -0.471*** -0.056***
CU -0.021 0.023 -0.144***
GDP exporter 0.370*** -0.833*** 0.889***
GDP importer 0.340*** -0.742*** 0.603***
GDP/cap. exporter 0.755*** 1.300*** -0.345***
GDP/cap. importer 0.734*** 1.317*** -0.375***
Current Colony 0.376*** -0.050 0.203*
Number of Obs 964173 964173 964173
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No
RESET test 0.42 0.59 0.00
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, Poisson, time effects and robust standard errors clustered
by country pair, Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports using 5 digit weighted data,
Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 5 digit weighted data,
Column 3: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number of products),
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
The above results could be related to the literature on level of development and
export diversification. Cadot et al. (2007) find that developing economies diversify at
the extensive margin. This could be the case because export diversification tends to be
connected with lower terms of trade volatility and higher growth. Moreover, the authors
show that developed economies tend to reconcentrate on fewer products. If this is the
case developed economies tend to concentrate on fewer products selling higher quantities
per product thus affecting the intensive margin more. These patterns could be reinforced
due to lower trade barriers through the WTO membership and our results for the two
margins in Tables 5 and 11 seem to support the evidence by Cadot et al. (2007).
5.2 The WTO effect by degree of product differentiation
Existing literature has shown that lower trade barriers enhance the extensive margin es-
pecially in the case of differentiated products. Besedes and Prusa (2004) showed that
trade relationships in differentiated products can be longer lived when compared with
those involving homogeneous products, since each variety is desirable for the consumers.
Combining those two effects, these studies suggest a potential group of products that
the WTO can have the largest and longest lived impact. This has serious implications
for policy makers and economic growth. Table 6 separates the WTO effect into product
groups according to Rauch (1999). Rauch separates the goods in his study into differ-
entiated products, products for which there is a reference price and products that are
traded in organized markets (homogeneous products).
Table 6 contains the WTO effects for the three product categories using Poisson
regression. Panel A contains the results for differentiated products. The positive effect
on total exports and the extensive margin continues to be present (Columns 1 and 3).
The effects on average sales are not significant. Trade creation is present only through
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aggregate exports and the extensive margin (the coefficients on one WTO members are
0.226 and 0.185 and are significant). The effects are similar for differentiated products in
the Robustness Results of Panel A in Table 13. Panel B contains the results for reference
priced products. There is a positive effect on the extensive margin, slightly higher than
the one for differentiated products. The WTO effect remains positive and significant for
total exports and for average sales. There are signs of trade creation between members
and non members both on the aggregate level and the two trade margins. Checking Panel
B in Table 13, the extensive margin remains significant, whereas the intensive margin and
total export effects become insignificant in some cases. There is trade creation with non
members mainly through the extensive margin. Finally, the results for homogeneous
products are presented in Panel C of Table 4.6. The results indicate a positive effect
on the extensive margin for the 5-digit weighted data. The effect is positive for total
exports and average sales as well. There is a trade creating effect with non members in
all the three cases. The robustness checks on Table 13 Panel C indicate that the results
are robust for the extensive margin, while insignificant in the 4-digit case for aggregate
exports and average sales. Comparing the extensive margin effects on the three product
categories the smallest one is the one for differentiated products for the 5-digit data,
while this effect is smallest for the homogeneous products at the 4 digit. The RESET
test indicates that the models for total exports satisfy the selected specification only for
differentiated and reference priced products (Columns 1 and 1, 4 and 7 of Panels A and
B in Tables 6 and 13 respectively).
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Table 6: The WTO Effect by degree of product differentiation
Panel A: Differentiated products
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both WTO members 0.510*** 0.141 0.270***
One WTO members 0.226** -0.078 0.185***
RTA 0.242* 0.284*** -0.029
One in RTA -0.064 -0.107** 0.127***
GSP -0.161 -0.031 -0.053**
Number of Obs 951210 951210 951210
RESET test 0.85 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Reference Priced Products
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both WTO members 0.411*** 0.261** 0.384***
One WTO members 0.376*** 0.394*** 0.308***
RTA 0.230*** 0.204** 0.036
One in RTA -0.083 -0.087 0.102***
GSP -0.113 0.092 -0.294***
Number of Obs 758454 758454 758454
RESET test 0.11 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Homogeneous Products
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both WTO members 1.013*** 0.702*** 0.400***
One WTO members 0.852*** 0.683*** 0.286***
RTA 0.446* -0.039 0.066
One in RTA -0.096 -0.148 0.114***
GSP .519*** 0.574*** -0.126***
Number of Obs 482987 482987 482987
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Poisson, time dummies and robust standard errors
clustered by country pair, Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports using 5 digit
weighted data, Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 5 digit weighted data,
Columns 3: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number of products),
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
An interesting first result from the tables is that the WTO effect is positive and
significant for all the product categories in Table 6. The overall insignificant WTO effect
found in Rose (2004a) is valid only for the homogeneous products and reference priced
product category at the 4-digit data (Table 13). The effect on total exports is positive
for differentiated products in all the cases. Moreover, there are generally signs of trade
creation for all product categories between members and non members.
The most robust result of Tables 6 and 13 is that the extensive margin is positively
affected by the WTO membership for all product categories. We have to note here
that in order to be able to compare the coefficients from the different panels, we need
to transform the coefficient as exp(β) − 1, where β is the estimated coefficient from
the table. From Table 6, applying this rule to the third column, we have that WTO
membership increases the number of varieties by exp(0.270)− 1 = 31% for differentiated
products, exp(0.384) − 1 = 46% for refernce priced products and exp(0.400) − 1 = 49%
for homogeneous products. These results at the 5 digit level are not in line with the
literature.
Most important is that the WTO effect is generally smaller for homogeneous products
than for differentiated products only at the 4-digit level. From Table 13, the effect on the
extensive margin for the differentiated products is exp(0.223) − 1 = 25%, for reference
priced products exp(0.226) − 1 = 25.3% and exp(0.126) − 1 = 13.5% for homogeneous
products. Here, the largest effect is in the case of differentiated products. This result
even if it is present only at the 4 digit level is in line with much of the existing literature.
Rauch (1999) suggests that search barriers to trade are higher for differentiated products
than for homogeneous products. Theoretical and empirical research has illustrated the
higher impact of trade liberalization on the extensive margin of differentiated products.
Chaney (2006) develops a model of heterogeneous firms and a fixed market entry cost.
The main results of this model are that the higher the elasticity of substitution between
the products (i.e. the more homogeneous the products) the more the intensive margin is
sensitive to trade barriers compared to the extensive margin. The reason for this is after
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a decrease in trade barriers new firms and less productive firms enter the market. If the
elasticity of substitution is high, low productivity firms cannot charge high prices and
they capture small market shares. The effect of these firms on aggregate trade is small.
In this case the intensive margin is affected more than the extensive margin. Moreover,
when the fixed trade costs are lower, this will affect the extensive margin and not the
intensive margin.
These two implications (that the increase in trade volume through trade liberaliza-
tion is realized via the extensive margin and that this result is strongest in the case of
differentiated products) of Chaney’s model and many of the heterogeneous firms models
of trade were empirically tested by many authors. Andersson (2007) argues that a reason
why fixed entry costs might be lower for some exporters is because these exporters are
familiar with the destination market. More familiarity should affect the fixed entry costs
and the extensive margin. Andersson (2007) finds this effect to be strongest for differ-
entiated than homogeneous goods. Koenig (2005) finds that the distance elasticity of
the intensive margin is higher for homogeneous products. The distance elasticity of the
extensive margin for the same products is found to be lower. There seems to be no sig-
nificant difference between the two categories of goods in terms of the distance elasticity
of total exports.
Frensch (2009) considers the effect of trade liberalization on the trade margins by
separating the products by use into intermediate, capital and consumer goods. He finds
that the extensive margin impact of trade liberalization is stronger in the case of inter-
mediate and capital goods that are more complementary goods than consumer goods.
Other studies on the effects of immigrant networks (Peri and Requena, 2009) or trade fa-
cilitation (Persson, 2009, Martinez-Zarzoso and Marquez-Ramos, 2008) on the extensive
margin, find that these effects are stronger for differentiated than homogeneous goods.
The results of Tables 6 and 13 are partially in line with the effects on the extensive
margins suggested by the studies mentioned above.
5.3 The WTO Effect by Sector
It is well known that certain sectors like agriculture, textiles and clothing were exempted
from the tariff reductions, even in the case of developed economies. The implication is
to test whether such an argument is supported by the data. Showing that the extensive
margin was affected at least in the sectors that were faced with high tariff reductions (such
as manufacturing), will mean that other sectors can benefit as well, resulting in numerous
welfare and economic growth gains. One of the findings in Subramanian and Wei (2007)
is that the WTO membership has a positive effect on trade in liberalized manufacturing
for all member countries, and on non-liberalized manufacturing for developed member
countries. The authors found no positive effect for textiles, footware and food. To
examine whether such an effect exist in our study, we divided the products in our data
in general categories similar to those defined in Subramanian and Wei (2007). Since we
are interested in capturing changes in the extensive margin and the footware sector is
narrow in terms of the total number of products in that category, we report the results
of footware and textiles together.
Table 7 contains the Poisson results per sector. The effects for textiles and textiles-
footware turn out to be significant for 5-digit weighted data. There is a positive and
significant effect between members and non-members on total exports and on the exten-
sive margin. Moreover, RTA membership and GSP arrangements seem to enhance the
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extensive margin as well. In Table 16, Panels A and B show robustness checks about the
Poisson. Results on liberalized manufacturing indicate a positive effect on total exports
and the two trade margins. There is also some trade creating effect with non-members.
These positive effects are present in the robustness checks in Panel C of Table 16. RTA
membership enhances trade between members through total exports and average sales
and between members and non members through the extensive margin. GSP seems to
harm trade through the extensive margin. Results on Table 16 are similar. Panel D illus-
trates the results for protected manufacturing. There are positive effects on average sales
and the number of products, as well as on total exports. There are trade creating effects
in all three cases. On the other hand, RTA membership affects positively total exports
and average sales. The GSP effects are negative. Results on Table 16 are similar. Finally,
for the food sector (Panel E) there seems to be no significant effect due to WTO member-
ship on members as well between members and non-members on aggregate trade. This
effect remains positive and significant for the extensive margin and average sales. GSP
has a positive effect mainly through the extensive margin and the RTA through total and
average exports. Results on Table 16 are similar. From all these models estimated, only
the regressions for total exports satisfy the RESET test for the manufacturing sectors
(Columns 1 and 1, 4 ,7, Panels C and D in Tables 7 and 16).
To sum up, the sectoral analysis confirms partially the findings of Subramanian and
Wei (2007) only in the case where Poisson estimation has been employed for aggregate
exports. WTO membership seems to be beneficial for all the product categories via
the extensive margin, with additional trade creating effects with non-members in all
the cases, at least for the extensive margin. Only the manufacturing sectors satisfy the
RESET test but only for the regressions on total exports. The Subramanian and Wei
results are confirmed on the aggregate, but our disaggregated analysis indicates that all
product categories could benefit through the extensive margin. The extensive margin
effect remains the highest in the case of the manufacturing sectors.
5.4 The WTO Effect and Multilateral Resistance
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) outline the potential bias that could arise in the esti-
mated parameters of a gravity model, if multilateral resistance is not taken into account.
By multilateral resistance the authors consider that ”trade between two regions is de-
creasing in their bilateral trade barrier relative to the average barrier of the two regions
to trade with all their partners”. This average trade barrier is multilateral resistance. Ta-
bles 8 and 19 in Appendix A account for multilateral resistance by introducing exporter
and importer time varying FE. This is a common practice in the literature as in Subra-
manian and Wei (2007), Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) and Eicher and Henn (2008). We
need to note at this point that the estimation was performed for only 12 years of data,
due to the lack of computing power.12
12The years used are 1962, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006.
27
Table 7: The WTO effect by sector
Panel A:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Clothing/Textiles
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both in WTO 0.560*** 0.371** 0.296***
One in WTO 0.278* 0.109 0.170***
RTA 0.373 0.378 -0.001
One in RTA -0.211** -0.108 0.138***
GSP 0.687*** 0.689*** 0.133***
Number of Obs 776096 776096 776096
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Clothing/Textiles/Footware
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both in WTO 0.546*** 0.391** 0.296***
One in WTO 0.281* 0.135 0.172***
RTA 0.371 0.389* -0.008
One in RTA -0.207* -0.100 0.137***
GSP 0.637*** 0.655*** 0.147***
Number of Obs 788457 788457 788457
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Liberalized Manufacturing
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both in WTO 0.847*** 0.463*** 0.343***
One in WTO 0.449*** 0.156 0.258***
RTA 0.384*** 0.455*** 0.007
One in RTA 0.014 0.037 0.153***
GSP -0.246 0.066 -0.111***
Number of Obs 779757 779757 779757
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel D:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Protected Manufacturing
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both in WTO 0.588*** 0.207** 0.296***
One in WTO 0.303*** 0.226** 0.233***
RTA 0.208* 0.335*** -0.035
One in RTA -0.001 -0.085 0.117***
GSP -0.480*** -0.089 -0.222***
Number of Obs 824447 824447 824447
RESET test 0.23 0.17 0.00
Panel E:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Food
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both in WTO 0.196 0.309*** 0.263***
One in WTO 0.018 0.152 0.159***
RTA 0.454*** 0.343*** -0.052
One in RTA -0.090 -0.112 0.008
GSP -0.032 -0.387*** 0.090***
Number of Obs 692194 692194 692194
RESET test 0.00 0.05 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Poisson, time effects and robust standard errors clustered
by country pair, Classification close to the one by Subramanian and Wei (2007),
Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports using 5 digit weighted data, Column 2:
Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 5 digit weighted data, Column 3 : Dependent variable
Extensive Margin (Total number of products),
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
Table 8 shows the results for the 5-digit weighted data. Panel A of Table 8 repeats
the analysis of Table 4, but using only the aforementioned 12 years to run the models
with the country pair FE. This is done to check whether the WTO effect changes once we
restrict our sample to those 12 years and use country pair FE as before. The WTO effect
remains positive and significant for the aggregate exports and the extensive margin. The
effect on the intensive margin is insignificant (0.175). The WTO seems to affect positively
aggregate exports with non-members (the coefficient for one WTO member is 0.555 and
highly significant). This holds for the trade margins as well. Being an RTA member
affects positively aggregate exports and the intensive margin among members. There are
no signs of trade diversion between RTA members and non RTA members.
Panel B presents the results when time varying exporter and importer FE are added
in the regression.13 There is a negative effect of WTO on total exports and the extensive
margin when both countries are WTO members, but it is insignificant. The effect on the
intensive margin remains insignificant. The effects between members and non members
13The difference in total number of observations in Panels A and B is due to the fact that some country
pairs are dropped in the estimation in Panel A. This is because these groups contain only zeros for the
dependent variable in the subsample used for the estimation in Table 8, so they do not contribute in the
estimation of the log likelihood function.
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are insignificant. RTA membership seems to foster trade between members at the aggre-
gate level and intensive margin. The effect is negative and significant for the extensive
margin. For the members and the non members the RTA membership tends to affect
positively total exports, with no effect on the margins. Table 19 Appendix A shows the
effects for the OLS regressions. In Panel A results resemble Panel A of Table 8. Panel B
of Table 19 shows that any positive effect comes from the RTA membership and not the
WTO membership. The insignificant WTO effect is in line with Eicher and Henn (2008)
and Rose’s (2004a) findings.
Table 8: WTO and the Trade Margins (5 digit data)-Poisson Regression
Panel A:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data)
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both WTO members 0.822*** 0.175 0.351***
One WTO members 0.555*** 0.532** 0.256***
RTA 0.320*** 0.432* 0.031
One in RTA -0.049 -0.193 0.151***
One in GSP 0.217* 0.140 -0.089***
Number of Obs 237518 237518 237518
RESET test 0.01 0.14 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No
Panel B :WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit)
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both WTO members -0.536 0.235 -0.125
One WTO members -0.003 0.453 -0.123
RTA 0.615*** 0.820*** -0.347***
One in RTA 0.278*** 0.193 -0.040
One in GSP 0.141 -0.570*** 0.492***
Number of Obs 271374 271374 271374
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE No No No
Time Varying FE Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Poisson Regression, time effects and time
varying exporter and importer FE using the years 1962, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982,
1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006 and robust standard errors clustered by country
pair, Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports using 5 digit weighted data,
Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 5 digit weighted data,
Column 3: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number of products),
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
In the current section, most of the effect of WTO membership becomes negative and
insignificant compared to the majority of the results in the previous sections. The effects
of RTA membership remain positive, at least between members, with a negative effect on
the extensive margin. The latter effect was usually insignificant for country members of
an RTA. What could explain this difference in these results? Country pair FE control for
omitted variables that are time invariant and unobserved. One of these variables could
be multilateral resistance (access to third markets). The country pair FE could account
only for the time invariant part of multilateral resistance. However, multilateral resistance
varies over time (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). So country pair FE cannot capture
entirely the omitted variability of multilateral resistance over time. Factors that can
affect multilateral resistance over time are cases in which countries generally pursue more
liberal trade policies or where transportation costs have fallen over time. This makes
access to third markets easier. Easier access has affected trade flows positively, but the
WTO membership might as well. If we do not consider the effect of easier access then
the WTO coefficient, and even the RTA effects, captures these positive effects of easier
access and is inflated in the regressions with only country pair FE. With the time varying
exporter and importer FE, this easier market access effect (that has varied over time)
is taken into account, and the WTO effect, free of the effect of easier market access, is
lower and even negative (but insignificant).
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6 Conclusions
The current study examined empirically the WTO effect on trade. Empirical facts and
theoretical arguments suggest that the establishment of GATT / WTO at the post war
era would be one of the reasons explaining the increase in world trade the same period. In
his seminal paper Rose (2004a) challenges the conventional wisdom by presenting findings
for an insignificant role of WTO on aggregate trade.
Using disaggregated data from UN Comtrade, we first aggregate our data and perform
an analysis closely related to Rose (2004a). We are able to find the same insignificant
effect of WTO on aggregate trade as Rose does. We then consider unilateral exports and
decompose export growth on two margins: the number of products between a country
pair in a given year (extensive margin) and the average value of exports per product
(intensive margin). Following the work of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we perform
PPML regression on all the models, which are also estimated by OLS (in Appendix A).
The results turn out to be robust at the 4-digit and 5-digit level for the extensive and the
intensive margin. The results are that the WTO effect on aggregate exports is positive
and significant. But once we consider the decomposition on the two margins it turns out
that WTO boosts average sales at the 5-digit data, but this result is less robust. On
the other hand, WTO has a strong significant positive effect on the number of products
traded, after WTO membership. Moreover, there is significant evidence of trade creation
as a result of joining the WTO through the extensive margin. The OLS results are
generally in line with those obtained from the Poisson analysis.
Our finding about the positive effect of WTO on the extensive margin is in line with
many other studies that found a positive effect of trade liberalization episodes on the
number of varieties traded. The results on the aggregate are in most cases positive and
significant which is not in line with Rose’s findings. The positive effects on average sales is
one extra interesting finding, even though less robust than the positive effect on aggregate
exports and the extensive margin. Average sales could potentially fall, partially due to
the effect of competition after a trade liberalization episode. However, other studies from
firm level data indicate that more productive firms are able to survive in the market and
these firms are able to maintain higher profits even if prices decrease due to competition.
A more plausible explanation might be that firms experiment by selling small quantities in
neighbouring markets to assess their performance as exporters. So new exporters might
be willing to bear the fixed entry cost and sell small quantities which therefore only
has a slight effect on aggregate exports and drives down average sales. This mechanical
effect is confirmed by our data in some cases. Albornoz et al. (2007) indicate that more
productive firms make larger first period profits, and are more likely to sell larger volumes
abroad and less likely to exit a new destination market.
The heterogeneity part of the analysis revealed that the effect on the extensive margin
remains once we consider the unobserved heterogeneity through country pair fixed effects.
When we test for the asymmetries tested in Subramanian and Wei (2007), the results
indicated that the effect was stronger when both the WTO member economies were
industrial and this effect on aggregate exports was positive in all the cases. The largest
WTO trade creating effect is in the case of the WTO member importer being a developing
or industrial economy and the exporter is a non member. The positive WTO effect on
the extensive margin is present between developing WTO members only. These results
only partially confirm the Subramanian and Wei (2007) findings. When we consider
the effect by sector, the Poisson indicated that any effect on aggregate exports present
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appears in all the sectors apart from food, with the largest effect on liberalized and
protected manufacturing. This result is in line with Subramanian and Wei (2007). But
this analysis revealed a positive and significant extensive and intensive margin effect in all
the sectors apart from food, with the manufacturing sectors reaping these benefit most.
These results suggest potential benefits of deeper trade liberalization between developed
and developing economies. Moreover, it suggests more welfare benefits once tariffs cuts
are expanded to currently relatively highly protected sectors.
Separating the effect by Rauch classifications, the results are mixed in terms of which
type of goods experiences the biggest impact. Only the 4-digit data indicated that the
effect of WTO on the extensive margin is higher for differentiated products compared to
homogeneous products. This result is in line with the existing literature. It also suggests
that export growth could come through expanding trade in differentiated products, as
these trade relationships are longer lived as suggested by Besedes and Prusa (2004).
These results are not robust once we consider multilateral resistance through exporter
and importer time varying FE. The role of the WTO is insignificant. The RTA effects
remain positive and significant for region members through total exports and the intensive
margin. These results, even though they should be interpreted with caution as they are
based on a subsample of our dataset, indicate that the estimated coefficients in a model
without multilateral resistance are inflated. The WTO seems to benefit countries that
would otherwise trade with each other anyway, regardless of their WTO membership,
because of being more orientated towards free trade policies. This might be the factor
that is affecting both the WTO membership and the trade flows. Maybe more generous
reductions in tariffs and non tariff measures are required from the country members to
truly benefit from the WTO system.
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7 Appendix A
7.1 Poisson Results-Robustness Checks
Beginning with Table 9, the first three columns are for the 4 digit unweighted trade data.
Focusing on the first column of Table 9, we can observe that there is evidence of a positive
significant WTO effect on aggregate exports. Furthermore, there is evidence of trade
creation on the aggregate level between members and non-members. Observing column 2
(intensive margin) and column 3 (extensive margin), we get a clearer picture. The effect
on the intensive margin is insignificant. The effect on the extensive margin is positive and
significant. In the models there is evidence of trade creating effects (coefficients on the
variable One WTO member are highly significant). These findings are robust when the
weighted 4-digit trade data are used in the next three columns of Table 9 and for the 5
digit unweighted data in the last 3 columns. On the aggregate, there is indication of WTO
trade enhancing effect, whereas there is evidence that the effect of WTO on average sales
is not robust, but boosts the number of products exported from one country member to
the other. There is significant evidence of trade creation again in all the models. In Table
9 the RESET test reveals that the specification seems to be valid only for the aggregate
exports in the 5 digit data and the intensive margin in some of the models.
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7.2 OLS-Accounting for Unobserved Heterogeneity
In Table 10, we have performed OLS with country pair fixed effects. This is to account
for potential unobserved heterogeneity of the form discussed in Eicher and Henn (2008).
Panel A of Table 10 contains the results for the 4-digit data and panel B for the 5-digit
data. Columns 1-3 refer to the unweighted data and columns 4-6 to the weighted data.
The effects on the extensive margin remain positive and significant. This is also the case
for total trade, the effect on which remains positive and significant only for the 5-digit
data. There is evidence of trade diversion on Panel A but not Panel B. All the models
fail to satisfy the specification test (the RESET test p value is zero in all cases). From
the other trade arrangements, RTAs seem to foster aggregate exports and average sales.
RTAs seem to affect the extensive margin between members and non members (One in
RTA has positive and significant effects on the extensive margin) compared to the case
between members. GSP seems to harm the extensive margin.
Table 10: Basic Regressions with country pair FE
Panel A:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data), ols
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.071* -0.136*** 0.065*** -0.077* -0.142*** 0.065***
One WTO members -0.109*** -0.073** -0.036* -0.113*** -0.077*** -0.036*
RTA 0.741*** 0.756*** -0.016 0.733*** 0.749*** -0.016
One in RTA 0.223*** 0.059*** 0.165*** 0.223*** 0.058*** 0.165***
One in GSP -0.102*** 0.105*** -0.207*** -0.093*** 0.114*** -0.207***
R-Square 0.773 0.584 0.822 0.773 0.584 0.822
Number of Obs 576809 576809 576809 576809 576809 576809
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data),ols
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members 0.134*** 0.037 0.097*** 0.137*** 0.040 0.097***
One WTO members -0.013 0.017 -0.030 -0.014 0.016 -0.030
RTA 0.686*** 0.631*** 0.055 0.671*** 0.616*** 0.055
One in RTA 0.270*** 0.052*** 0.219*** 0.265*** 0.046*** 0.219***
One in GSP -0.055 0.161*** -0.217*** -0.041 0.176*** -0.217***
R-Square 0.774 0.581 0.811 0.773 0.581 0.811
Number of Obs 498927 498927 498927 498927 498927 498927
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No No No No
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, OLS, time effects and robust standard errors clustered by country pair,
Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports using unweighted data, Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive
Margin using unweighted data, Column 3 and 6: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number of products),
Column 4: Dependent variable Total Exports weighted data, Column 5: Dependent variable Intensive
Margin using weighted data.
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
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Table 12: The WTO effect by country group
Panel A:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data)
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both Industrial and WTO -0.092 0.168* -0.259*** -0.093 0.167* -0.259***
Importer Industrial, Exporter
Developing and both WTO -0.109 0.208*** -0.318*** -0.089 0.228*** -0.318***
Importer Developing, Exporter
Industrial and both WTO -0.503*** -0.430*** -0.073 -0.517*** -0.444*** -0.073
Both Developing and WTO -0.003 -0.166*** 0.164*** -0.014 -0.177*** 0.164***
Importer Industrial and WTO,
Exporter not in WTO -0.206** 0.192*** -0.399*** -0.205** 0.194*** -0.399***
Importer Developing and WTO,
Exporter not in WTO -0.194*** -0.054* -0.141*** -0.200*** -0.059* -0.141***
Exporter Industrial and WTO,
Importer not in WTO -0.403*** -0.484*** 0.081* -0.412*** -0.493*** 0.081*
Exporter Developing and WTO,
Importer not in WTO 0.023 -0.065** 0.088*** 0.019 -0.069** 0.088***
RTA 0.725*** 0.749*** -0.024 0.718*** 0.742*** -0.024
One in RTA 0.239*** 0.091*** 0.148*** 0.240*** 0.091*** 0.148***
One in GSP -0.235*** -0.166*** -0.069*** -0.236*** -0.167*** -0.069***
R-Square 0.774 0.587 0.825 0.773 0.587 0.825
Number of Obs 576809 576809 576809 576809 576809 576809
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data)
Both Industrial and WTO 0.305** 0.567*** -0.261*** 0.309** 0.571*** -0.261***
Importer Industrial,Exporter
Developing and both WTO 0.135 0.494*** -0.359*** 0.160* 0.518*** -0.359***
Importer Developing, Exporter
Industrial and both WTO -0.199** -0.225*** 0.027 -0.209** -0.235*** 0.027
Both Developing and WTO 0.197*** 0.011 0.186*** 0.197*** 0.010 0.186***
Importer Industrial and WTO,
Exporter not in WTO -0.007 0.483*** -0.489*** -0.002 0.487*** -0.489***
Importer Developing and WTO,
Exporter not in WTO -0.063 0.086** -0.149*** -0.067 0.082** -0.149***
Exporter Industrial and WTO,
Importer not in WTO -0.227** -0.349*** 0.122** -0.232** -0.354*** 0.122**
Exporter Developing and WTO,
Importer not in WTO 0.053 -0.064* 0.117*** 0.053 -0.064* 0.117***
RTA 0.667*** 0.615*** 0.052 0.652*** 0.600*** 0.052
One in RTA 0.283*** 0.085*** 0.198*** 0.279*** 0.081*** 0.198***
One in GSP -0.172*** -0.142*** -0.030 -0.168*** -0.138*** -0.030
R-Square 0.774 0.585 0.814 0.774 0.585 0.814
Number of Obs 498927 498927 498927 498927 498927 498927
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No No No No
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, OLS, time dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country pair,
country pair FE included, Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports using unweighted data, Column 2: Dependent
variable Intensive Margin using unweighted data, Column 3: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number
of products), Column 4: Dependent variable Total Exports using weighted data, Column 5: Dependent variable
Intensive Margin using weighted data, Column 6: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number of products),
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
7.3 The WTO effect by degree of product differentiation-Robustness
Checks.
Table 13 contains the rest of the Poisson results as described in the main text. Table
14 and 15 contain the OLS results for the 4-digit and 5-digit data. We also account for
country pair FE in the OLS. The 3 panels of Table 4.14 contain the results for the 3
categories of goods according to Rauch, for the 4 digit data. Panel A presents the results
for the differentiated products. The first 3 columns of this panel summarize the results
for the 4 digit unweighted data and the last 3 for the weighted data. The first 3 columns
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indicate an insignificant effect of WTO on total exports, a significant negative effect on
average sales and a positive significant effect on the number of products traded. There
is also trade diversion in all the 3 cases. Focusing on the last 3 columns of Panel A the
results are similar. To sum up, trade in differentiated products seems to be positively
affected by WTO membership mainly through the extensive margin. In panel B, the
results for reference priced products are shown. The effect on total exports is negative and
significant as well as on average sales. The extensive margin seems to remain unaffected
by the WTO membership. The effect on the extensive margin for reference price products
turns out to be smaller than for differentiated products. There are also signs of trade
diversion for this category of goods. Panel C, shows a negative and significant (columns
3 and 6) effect on the extensive margin. The effect on aggregate exports and average
sales is negative and there are also signs of trade diversion. The effect of WTO on the
extensive margin for homogeneous products is the smallest for all the 3 categories.
Panels A, B, C of Table 15 illustrate the effects for the 5 digit data. Panel A contains
the results for differentiated products. These results are qualitatively the same as those
in Panel A of Table 14. The positive effect on the extensive margin is the most robust
result. Panel B shows the results for reference priced products. While the negative effect
on total exports and average sales as well the trade diversion effect are absent, there is
now a significant positive effect on the extensive margin. This effect remains smaller than
the one for differentiated products. Finally, the positive effect of WTO on the extensive
margin is now present for homogeneous products as well. The effect on the extensive
margin on the three categories is now more comparable for the unweighted data (first 3
columns), but remains larger for the differentiated products case only in the 4-digit data
(Column 6 of panels A, B and C of Table 14). Tables 14 and 15 represent the analysis
for OLS and country pair fixed effects. All the models fail to pass the RESET test.
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Table 14: The WTO Effect by degree of product differentiation
Panel A:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data), Differentiated products
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.074 -0.138*** 0.064** -0.084* -0.148*** 0.064**
One WTO members -0.222*** -0.180*** -0.042** -0.230*** -0.188*** -0.042**
RTA 0.824*** 0.882*** -0.058* 0.812*** 0.871*** -0.058*
One in RTA 0.310*** 0.141*** 0.169*** 0.308*** 0.139*** 0.169***
One in GSP -0.265*** -0.090*** -0.176*** -0.253*** -0.077*** -0.176***
R-Square 0.778 0.620 0.800 0.777 0.619 0.800
Number of Obs 531108 531108 531108 531108 531108 531108
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data), Reference Priced Products
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.140*** -0.166*** 0.025 -0.145*** -0.170*** 0.025
One WTO members -0.093** -0.070** -0.023 -0.098** -0.075** -0.023
RTA 0.794*** 0.651*** 0.143*** 0.782*** 0.639*** 0.143***
One in RTA 0.282*** 0.127*** 0.155*** 0.279*** 0.124*** 0.155***
One in GSP -0.520*** -0.179*** -0.341*** -0.510*** -0.169*** -0.341***
R-Square 0.712 0.549 0.802 0.711 0.548 0.802
Number of Obs 423516 423516 423516 423516 423516 423516
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data), Homogeneous Products
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.276*** -0.235*** -0.041** -0.268*** -0.227*** -0.041**
One WTO members -0.064 -0.020 -0.044*** -0.061 -0.017 -0.044***
RTA 0.693*** 0.473*** 0.220*** 0.690*** 0.470*** 0.220***
One in RTA 0.010 -0.056** 0.066*** 0.009 -0.058** 0.066***
One in GSP 0.617*** 0.640*** -0.023* 0.622*** 0.644*** -0.023*
R-Square 0.591 0.496 0.757 0.590 0.496 0.757
Number of Obs 350833 350833 350833 350833 350833 350833
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No No No No
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, OLS, time effects and robust standard errors clustered by country pair,
country pair FE included, Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports using 4 digit unweighted data,
Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 4 digit unweighted data, Columns 3 and 6: Dependent variable
Extensive Margin (Total number of products) using 4 digit data, Column 4: Dependent variable Total Exports
using 4 digit weighted data, Column 5: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 4 digit weighted data,
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
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Table 15: The WTO Effect by degree of product differentiation
Panel A:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Differentiated products
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.023 -0.103*** 0.080*** -0.013 -0.093*** 0.080***
One WTO members -0.227*** -0.184*** -0.043* -0.218*** -0.176*** -0.043*
RTA 0.730*** 0.701*** 0.029 0.706*** 0.676*** 0.029
One in RTA 0.340*** 0.125*** 0.215*** 0.329*** 0.114*** 0.215***
One in GSP -0.246*** -0.071*** -0.175*** -0.225*** -0.050** -0.175***
R-Square 0.774 0.606 0.797 0.772 0.602 0.797
Number of Obs 473790 473790 473790 473790 473790 473790
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Reference Priced Products
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members 0.032 -0.048 0.080*** 0.036 -0.044 0.080***
One WTO members 0.016 0.021 -0.005 0.016 0.021 -0.005
RTA 0.833*** 0.597*** 0.235*** 0.813*** 0.578*** 0.235***
One in RTA 0.269*** 0.094*** 0.175*** 0.261*** 0.086*** 0.175***
One in GSP -0.443*** -0.016 -0.427*** -0.422*** 0.006 -0.427***
R-Square 0.706 0.535 0.799 0.704 0.533 0.799
Number of Obs 335638 335638 335638 335638 335638 335638
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Homogeneous Products
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members 0.457*** 0.362*** 0.095*** 0.470*** 0.375*** 0.095***
One WTO members 0.430*** 0.402*** 0.028 0.436*** 0.408*** 0.028
RTA 0.726*** 0.531*** 0.195*** 0.702*** 0.507*** 0.195***
One in RTA -0.056 -0.132*** 0.077*** -0.064 -0.140*** 0.077***
One in GSP 0.999*** 1.157*** -0.158*** 1.014*** 1.171*** -0.158***
R-Square 0.590 0.557 0.711 0.590 0.558 0.711
Number of Obs 167147 167147 167147 167147 167147 167147
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No No No No
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, OLS, time effects and robust standard errors clustered by country pair,
country pair FE included, Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports using 5 digit unweighted data,
Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 5 digit unweighted data, Columns 3 and 6: Dependent variable
Extensive Margin (Total number of products) using 5 digit data, Column 4: Dependent variable Total Exports
using 5 digit weighted data, Column 5: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 5 digit weighted data,
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
7.4 The WTO effect by sector-Robustness Checks
Table 16 contains the rest of the Poisson results as described in the main text. Tables 17
and 18 contain results about the WTO effects per sector estimated by OLS with country
pair fixed effects at the 4 and 5 digit respectively. Panel A in each table contains the
results for textiles. Both panels indicate a positive effect on the extensive margin and in
most cases on total exports. There is also trade diversion present in this sector. Panel B
in both tables illustrate the results for textiles and footware. These results are similar to
those for the textile sector. Panel C contains results for liberalized manufacturing. There
is no effect on total exports and the extensive margin, whereas there is an adverse effect
on average sales. There are also signs of trade diversion. Panel D shows similar results
for protected manufacturing as for liberalized manufacturing. In this case the effect on
aggregate exports is negative. Finally, panels E show the results for food sector. There is
no effect on the extensive margin, whereas the effects on total exports and average sales
are less robust in the two panels. All these models fail to satisfy the RESET test. The
OLS results indicate positive effects on textiles and footware, in contrast to Subramanian
and Wei (2007).
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Table 17: The WTO effect by sector
Panel A:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data), Clothing/Textiles
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members 0.137* 0.067 0.069*** 0.112 0.042 0.069***
One WTO members -0.136** -0.108** -0.028 -0.161** -0.132** -0.028
RTA 1.015*** 0.946*** 0.069*** 0.987*** 0.917*** 0.069***
One in RTA 0.209*** 0.093*** 0.116*** 0.205*** 0.089*** 0.116***
One in GSP 0.312*** 0.325*** -0.013 0.312*** 0.325*** -0.013
R-Square 0.661 0.594 0.691 0.660 0.592 0.691
Number of Obs 311524 311524 311524 311524 311524 311524
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data), Cloth/Textile/Foot ware
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members 0.130* 0.053 0.077*** 0.102 0.024 0.077***
One WTO members -0.132** -0.107** -0.025 -0.157** -0.132** -0.025
RTA 1.059*** 1.000*** 0.059** 1.032*** 0.972*** 0.059**
One in RTA 0.237*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.235*** 0.115*** 0.120***
One in GSP 0.347*** 0.348*** -0.001 0.347*** 0.348*** -0.001
R-Square 0.663 0.592 0.692 0.661 0.590 0.692
Number of Obs 322510 322510 322510 322510 322510 322510
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data), Liberalized Manufacturing
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.087 -0.087* 0.001 -0.098 -0.099** 0.001
One WTO members -0.297*** -0.213*** -0.083*** -0.303*** -0.220*** -0.083***
RTA 1.019*** 1.038*** -0.019 1.015*** 1.034*** -0.019
One in RTA 0.383*** 0.227*** 0.156*** 0.385*** 0.229*** 0.156***
One in GSP -0.662*** -0.408*** -0.254*** -0.656*** -0.402*** -0.254***
R-Square 0.752 0.658 0.757 0.750 0.655 0.757
Number of Obs 377588 377588 377588 377588 377588 377588
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel D:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data), Protected Manufacturing
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.090 -0.107*** 0.017 -0.101* -0.118*** 0.017
One WTO members -0.187*** -0.124*** -0.064*** -0.193*** -0.129*** -0.064***
RTA 0.921*** 0.924*** -0.002 0.913*** 0.915*** -0.002
One in RTA 0.281*** 0.115*** 0.166*** 0.282*** 0.116*** 0.166***
One in GSP -0.631*** -0.355*** -0.276*** -0.632*** -0.355*** -0.276***
R-Square 0.759 0.637 0.775 0.758 0.636 0.775
Number of Obs 409425 409425 409425 409425 409425 409425
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel E:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (4 digit data), Food
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.178*** -0.205*** 0.027 -0.177*** -0.204*** 0.027
One WTO members -0.141*** -0.116*** -0.024 -0.142*** -0.118*** -0.024
RTA 0.843*** 0.663*** 0.180*** 0.832*** 0.652*** 0.180***
One in RTA 0.157*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.150*** 0.077*** 0.074***
One in GSP -0.328*** -0.256*** -0.072*** -0.309*** -0.238*** -0.072***
R-Square 0.617 0.484 0.736 0.616 0.484 0.736
Number of Obs 398083 398083 398083 398083 398083 398083
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No No No No
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, OLS, time effects and robust standard errors clustered by country pair,
country pair FE included, Classification close to the one by Subramanian and Wei (2007), Column 1: Dependent variable
Total Exports using 4 digit unweighted data, Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 4 digit unweighted data,
Column 3 and 6: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number of products), Column 4: Dependent variable
Total Exports using 4 digit weighted data, Column 5: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 4 digit weighted data,
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
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Table 18: The WTO effect by sector
Panel A:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Clothing/Textiles
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members 0.140* 0.031 0.108*** 0.139* 0.031 0.108***
One WTO members -0.181*** -0.163*** -0.019 -0.189*** -0.171*** -0.019
RTA 0.896*** 0.763*** 0.133*** 0.862*** 0.730*** 0.133***
One in RTA 0.185*** 0.050* 0.134*** 0.173*** 0.038 0.134***
One in GSP 0.606*** 0.534*** 0.072*** 0.621*** 0.549*** 0.072***
R-Square 0.664 0.592 0.680 0.663 0.591 0.680
Number of Obs 296737 296737 296737 296737 296737 296737
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Clothing/Textiles/Foot ware
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members 0.166** 0.056 0.110*** 0.165** 0.055 0.110***
One WTO members -0.145** -0.131*** -0.014 -0.153** -0.139*** -0.014
RTA 0.937*** 0.816*** 0.121*** 0.904*** 0.783*** 0.121***
One in RTA 0.205*** 0.068** 0.137*** 0.194*** 0.057** 0.137***
One in GSP 0.644*** 0.560*** 0.084*** 0.659*** 0.575*** 0.084***
R-Square 0.664 0.592 0.679 0.663 0.590 0.679
Number of Obs 306066 306066 306066 306066 306066 306066
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Liberalized Manufacturing
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.051 -0.096** 0.045 -0.043 -0.087* 0.045
One WTO members -0.242*** -0.199*** -0.044* -0.237*** -0.193*** -0.044*
RTA 1.050*** 0.920*** 0.130*** 1.046*** 0.916*** 0.130***
One in RTA 0.424*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.422*** 0.210*** 0.212***
One in GSP -0.521*** -0.181*** -0.340*** -0.510*** -0.170*** -0.340***
R-Square 0.756 0.637 0.774 0.755 0.636 0.774
Number of Obs 322271 322271 322271 322271 322271 322271
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel D:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Protected Manufacturing
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members -0.118** -0.130*** 0.012 -0.118** -0.130*** 0.012
One WTO members -0.212*** -0.143*** -0.069*** -0.211*** -0.143*** -0.069***
RTA 0.807*** 0.721*** 0.086** 0.794*** 0.708*** 0.086**
One in RTA 0.335*** 0.138*** 0.197*** 0.331*** 0.134*** 0.197***
One in GSP -0.812*** -0.388*** -0.424*** -0.807*** -0.383*** -0.424***
R-Square 0.752 0.612 0.785 0.751 0.611 0.785
Number of Obs 350123 350123 350123 350123 350123 350123
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel E:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), Food
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.margin
Both WTO members 0.120* 0.090* 0.029 0.120* 0.090* 0.029
One WTO members -0.054 -0.030 -0.024 -0.056 -0.032 -0.024
RTA 0.809*** 0.639*** 0.170*** 0.790*** 0.620*** 0.170***
One in RTA 0.094*** 0.069*** 0.025** 0.086*** 0.061** 0.025**
One in GSP -0.297*** -0.332*** 0.034* -0.278*** -0.312*** 0.034*
R-Square 0.641 0.526 0.705 0.639 0.525 0.705
Number of Obs 279262 279262 279262 279262 279262 279262
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No No No No
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, OLS, time effects and robust standard errors clustered by country pair,
country pair FE included, Classification close to the one by Subramanian and Wei (2007), Column 1: Dependent variable
Total Exports using 5 digit unweighted data, Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 5 digit unweighted data,
Column 3 and 6: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number of products), Column 4: Dependent variable
Total Exports using 5 digit weighted data, Column 5: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 5 digit weighted data,
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
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7.5 The WTO effect and Multilateral Resistance-Robustness
Checks
Table 19: The WTO Effect and Multilateral Resistance
Panel A:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data), ols
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both in WTO 0.091* -0.005 0.096***
One in WTO -0.028 0.048 -0.076***
RTA 0.545*** 0.372*** 0.173***
One in RTA 0.221*** -0.047** 0.268***
GSP -0.037 0.143*** -0.180***
R-Square 0.784 0.601 0.816
Number of Obs 130946 130946 130946
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Time Varying FE No No No
Panel B:WTO, RTA and the Trade Margins (5 digit data),ols
Variables Total Trade Int.Margin Ext.Margin
Both in WTO -0.484** -0.094 -0.390***
One in WTO -0.351*** -0.049 -0.302***
RTA 0.324** 0.538*** -0.214**
One in RTA -0.059 0.033 -0.092***
One in GSP 0.487*** 0.051 0.436***
R-Square 0.738 0.548 0.815
Number of Obs 133607 133607 133607
RESET test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair FE No No No
Time Varying FE Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, OLS Regression, time effects and time
varying exporter and importer FE using the years 1962, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982,
1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006 and robust standard errors clustered by country
pair, Column 1: Dependent variable Total Exports using 5 digit weighted data,
Column 2: Dependent variable Intensive Margin using 5 digit weighted data,
Column 3: Dependent variable Extensive Margin (Total number of products),
Figures next to RESET test are the p-values for the test for the model in each column.
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8 Appendix B
Table 20: List of countries and year of accession in GATT/WTO
Albania (2000) Ghana (1957) Panama (1997)
Algeria Greece (1950)* Papua N. Guinea (1994)
Angola (1994) Grenada (1994) Paraguay (1994)
Antigua and Barbuda (1987) Guatemala (1991) Peru (1951)
Argentina (1967) Guinea (1994) Philippines (1979)
Armenia(2003) Guinea-Bissau (1994) Poland (1967)
Australia (1948)* Guyana (1966) Portugal (1962)*
Austria (1951)* Haiti (1950) Qatar (1994)
Azerbaijan Honduras (1994) Romania (1971)
Bahamas Hong Kong (1986) Russia
Bahrain (1993) Hungary (1973) Rwanda (1966)
Bangladesh (1972) Iceland (1968)* Samoa
Barbados (1967) India (1948) Sao Tome and Principe
Belarus Indonesia (1950) Saudi Arabia (2005)
Belgium (1948)* Iran Senegal (1963)
Belize (1983) Iraq Seychelles
Benin (1963) Ireland (1967)* Sierra Leone (1961)
Bermuda Israel (1962) Singapore (1973)
Bhutan Italy (1950)* Slovak Republic (1993)
Bolivia (1990) Jamaica (1963) Slovenia (1994)
Botswana (1987) Japan (1955)* Solomon Islands (1994)
Brazil (1948) Jordan(2000) Somalia
Bulgaria (1996) Kazakhstan South Africa (1948)
Burkina Faso (1963) Kenya (1964) Spain (1963)*
Burma(Myanmar) (1948) Kiribati Sri Lanka (1948)
Burundi (1965) Korea, South (R)(1967) St. Kitts and Nevis (1994)
Cambodia(2004) Kuwait (1963) St. Lucia (1993)
Cameroon (1963) Kyrgyz Republic (1998) St. Vincent and Gren.(1993)
Canada (1948)* Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Sudan
Cape Verde (2008) Latvia (1999) Suriname (1978)
Central African Rep. (1963) Lebanon Swaziland (1993)
Chad (1963) Lesotho (1988) Sweden (1950)*
Chile (1949) Liberia Switzerland (1966)*
China(2001) Libya Syria
Colombia (1981) Lithuania(2001) Tajikistan
Comoros Luxembourg (1948)* Tanzania (1961)
Congo, Dem. Rep. of (Zaire) (1971) Macedonia Thailand (1982)
Congo, Rep. (1963) Madagascar (1963) Togo (1964)
Costa Rica (1990) Malawi (1964) Tonga(2007)
Cote D’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) (1963) Malaysia (1957) Trinidad and Tobago (1962)
Croatia(2000) Maldives (1983) Tunisia (1990)
Cyprus (1963) Mali (1993) Turkey (1951)
Czech Republic (1993) Malta (1964) Turkmenistan
Denmark (1950)* Mauritania (1963) Uganda (1962)
Djibouti (1994) Mauritius (1970) Ukraine (2008)
Dominica (1993) Mexico (1986) United Arab Emirates (1994)
Dominican Rep. (1950) Moldova (2001) United Kingdom (1948)*
Ecuador (1996) Mongolia (1997) United States (1948)*
Egypt (1970) Morocco (1987) Uruguay (1953)
El Salvador (1991) Mozambique (1992) Uzbekistan
Equatorial Guinea Namibia (1992) Vanuatu
Estonia (1999) Nepal(2004) Venezuela (1990)
Ethiopia Netherlands (1948)* Vietnam (2007)
Fiji (1993) New Zealand (1948)* Yemen, Republic of
Finland (1950)* Nicaragua (1950) Yugoslavia, Socialist Fed. R. (1966)
France (1948)* Niger (1963) Zambia (1982)
Gabon (1963) Nigeria (1960) Zimbabwe (1948)
Gambia (1965) Norway (1948)*
Georgia(2000) Oman(2000)
Germany (1951)* Pakistan (1948)
Dates in parentheses are years of accession in GATT/WTO, * indicates developed economy according to
Subramanian and Wei (2007)
Table 21: List of Regional Trade Agreements
ASEAN
Cambodia(1998) China(2003) Lao(1997) Indonesia(1993)
Malaysia(1993) Myanmar(1997) Philippines(1993) Singapore(1993)
Thailand(1993) Vietnam(1998)
ANCERTA
Australia (1983) New Zealand (1983)
PATCRA
Australia(1977-1980) Papua New Guinea(1977-1980)
CARICOM
Antigua and Barbuda (1976) Bahamas (1983) Barbados(1973) Belize(1973)
Dominica(1976) Guyana(1973) Grenada(1973) Haiti(1997)
Jamaica(1973) St. Kittis and Nevis (1975) St. Lucia(1975)
St. Vincent Suriname (1995) Trinidad and Tobago (1973)
and Grenadines(1976)
CACM
Costa Rica(1962) El Salvador (1961) Guatemala(1961) Honduras(1961)
Nicaragua (1961)
US-Israel
USA (1985) Israel(1985)
NAFTA
Canada(1989) Mexixo(1994) USA(1989)
MERCOSUR
49
Argentina(1991) Bolivia(1997) Brazil(1991) Chile(1996)
Paraguay(1991) Uruguay(1991)
SPARTECA
Australia(1981) New Zealand(1981)
Fiji(1981) Kiribati(1981) Papua new Guinea(1981) Samoa(1981)
Solomon Islands(1981) Tonga(1981) Vanuatu(1981)
ECU/EU
Belgium(1962) Luxembourg(1962) France(1962) Germany(1962)
Italy(1962) Netherlands(1962) Denmark(1973) Ireland(1973)
United Kingdom(1973) Greece(1981) Spain(1986) Portugal(1986)
Austria(1995) Finland(1995) Sweden(1995) Cyprus(2004)
Czech Republic(2004) Estonia(2004) Hungary(2004) Latvia(2004)
Lithuania(2004) Malta(2004) Poland(2004) Slovak Republic(2004)
Slovenia(2004) Bulgaria(2007) Romania(2007)
Dates in parentheses are years of joining the various Regional Trade Agreements
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List of product codes by sector
Textiles-Clothing-Footware
2640, 2654, 2655, 2658, 2670, 6123, 6515, 6519, 6521, 6522, 6532, 6533, 6534, 6535, 6536, 6537, 6539, 6540, 6557, 8411, 8412, 8413, 8414,
8415, 8416, 8420, 8510.
Food
0111, 0112, 0113, 0114, 0115, 0116, 0118, 0121, 0129, 0133, 0134, 0138, 0221, 0222, 0223, 0230, 0240, 0250, 0311, 0312, 0313, 0320, 0421,
0422, 0460, 0470, 0481, 0483, 0484, 0488, 0511, 0512, 0513, 0514, 0515, 0517, 0519, 0520, 0532, 0533, 0535, 0536, 0539, 0541, 0542, 0544,
0545, 0546, 0548, 0551, 0546, 0548, 0554, 0555, 0611, 0612, 0615, 0616, 0619, 0620, 0711, 0713, 0722, 0730, 0741, 0742, 0751, 0752, 0914,
0990, 1210, 1221, 1222, 1223, 2214, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2219, 2929, 4113, 4215, 5129.
Liberalized Manufacturing
3325, 5121, 5122, 5123, 5124, 5125, 5126, 5127, 5128, 5129, 5411, 5413, 5414, 5415, 5416, 5417, 5419, 5541, 5542, 5543, 5997, 5999, 6642,
7221, 7222, 7231, 7232, 7241, 7242, 7249, 7250, 7261, 7262, 7291, 7292, 7293, 7294, 7295, 7296, 7297, 7299, 8124, 8210, 8611, 8612, 8613,
8614, 8615, 8616, 8617, 8618, 8619, 8911, 8912, 8993, 8996
Protected Manufacturing
2840, 5131, 5132, 5133, 5134, 5135, 5136, 5141, 5142, 5143, 5149, 5151, 5152, 5153, 5310, 5321, 5323, 5324, 5331, 5332, 5333, 5713, 5711,
5712, 5811, 5812, 5813, 5819, 5992, 5996, 5997, 5999, 6518, 6538, 6623, 6624, 6637, 6639, 6641, 6642, 6643, 6644, 6645, 6647, 6648, 6649,
6651, 6652, 6658, 6664, 6665, 6666, 6793, 6841, 6842, 6921, 6922, 6923, 6931, 6972, 6989, 6880, 6893, 6894, 6895, 6912, 7111, 7112, 7113,
7114, 7115, 7116, 7117, 7118, 7121, 7122, 7123, 7125, 7129, 7141, 7142, 7143, 7149, 7151, 7152, 7171, 7172, 7173, 7181, 7182, 7183, 7184,
7185, 7191, 7192, 7193, 7195, 7196, 7197, 7198, 7199, 7250, 7321, 7322, 7323, 7324, 7325, 7327, 7328, 7329, 7331, 7333, 7334, 8121, 8122,
8930, 8941, 8959, 8993, 9510.
These are the codes according to SITC classification, Revision 1 at the 4 digit disaggregation. The codes used at the 5 digit are the
ones corresponding to the 4 digit ones shown above. The sectors are after Subramanian and Wei (2007). In Subramanian and Wei (2007)
the classification is done following the HS 88/92 classification. In this paper, we use the HS 88/92 - SITC 1 correspondence to extract the
corresponding codes and divide our data in more general subsamples to perform the analysis in Tables 4.6 and 4.16-4.18 above. The Data are
extracted from UN Comtrade.
List of product codes according to Rauch Classification.
Differentiated Products
0015, 0115, 0118, 0133, 0138, 0250, 0311, 0320, 0460, 0483, 0484, 0488, 0519, 0520, 0532, 0533, 0539, 0555, 0619, 0713, 0730, 0742, 0014,
0990, 1110, 1122, 1210, 2112, 2114, 2116, 2117, 2120, 2217, 2218, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2411, 2412, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2440, 2623, 2625, 2626,
2629, 2664, 2670, 2711, 2731, 2751, 2752, 2761, 2764, 2769, 2911, 2919, 2921, 2922, 2923, 2924, 2926, 2927, 2929, 3214, 3215, 3216, 3217,
3329, 4113, 4313, 4314, 5151, 5213, 5332, 5333, 5413, 5414, 5415, 5416, 5417, 5419, 5511, 5512, 5530, 5541, 5542, 5543, 5711, 5712, 5713,
5714, 5812, 5813, 5819, 5992, 5995, 5997, 5999, 6112, 6114, 6119, 6130, 6210, 6291, 6294, 6299, 6312, 6318, 6321, 6324, 6328, 6330, 6419, 6429,
6511, 6515, 6517, 6518, 6519, 6522, 6531, 6532, 6533, 6535, 6536, 6537, 6539, 6540, 6551, 6554, 6555, 6556, 6557, 6558, 6559, 6561, 6562, 6566,
6569, 6574, 6575, 6576, 6577, 6578, 6613, 6618, 6623, 6624, 6631, 6632, 6634, 6636, 6638, 6641, 6642, 6643, 6644, 6645, 6646, 6647, 6648, 6649,
6651, 6658, 6664, 6665, 6666, 6674, 6721, 6723, 6725, 6734, 6735, 6781, 6782, 6783, 6785, 6791, 6792, 6793, 6893, 6894, 6895, 6913, 6921, 6931,
6933, 6934, 6941, 6942, 6951, 6952, 6960, 6971, 6972, 6979, 6981, 6982, 6983, 6984, 6985, 6988, 6989, 7111, 7112, 7114, 7115, 7116, 7118, 7121,
7122, 7123, 7125, 7129, 7141, 7142, 7143, 7149, 7151, 7152, 7171, 7172, 7173, 7181, 7182, 7183, 7184, 7185, 7191, 7192, 7193, 7194, 7195, 7196,
7197, 7198, 7199, 7221, 7222, 7231, 7232, 7241, 7242, 7249, 7250, 7261, 7262, 7291, 7292, 7293, 7294, 7295, 7296, 7297, 7299, 7311, 7313, 7316,
7321, 7322, 7323, 7324, 7325, 7328, 7329, 7331, 7333, 7334, 7341, 7349, 7351, 7353, 7359, 8121, 8122, 8123, 8124, 8210, 8310, 8411, 8412, 8413,
8414, 8415, 8416, 8420, 8510, 8611, 8612, 8613, 8614, 8615, 8616, 8617, 8618, 8619, 8624, 8630, 8641, 8642, 8911, 8912, 8914, 8918, 8921, 8922,
8923, 8929, 8930, 8941, 8942, 8943, 8944, 8945, 8951, 8952, 8959, 8960, 8972, 8991, 8992, 8993, 8994, 8995, 8996, 8999, 9110, 9310, 9410, 9510.
Referenced Priced Products
0019, 0112, 0114, 0129, 0134, 0221, 0222, 0223, 0230, 0240, 0313, 0470, 0481, 0511, 0512, 0514, 0515, 0536, 0542, 0544, 0545, 0546, 0548,
0554, 0561, 0616, 0620, 0722, 0723, 0752, 0811, 0812, 0814, 0819, 1121, 1123, 1124, 1222, 1223, 2111, 2118, 2119, 2211, 2213, 2215, 2216,
2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2429, 2511, 2512, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2627, 2632, 2633, 2658, 2662, 2663, 2712, 2732, 2733, 2734, 2741,
2762, 2763, 2765, 2766, 2831, 2832, 2833, 2834, 2835, 2836, 2837, 2839, 2840, 2850, 2860, 2925, 3218, 3325, 3326, 3411, 3510, 4111, 4311,
4312, 5121, 5122, 5123, 5124, 5125, 5126, 5127, 5128, 5129, 5131, 5132, 5134, 5135, 5136, 5141, 5142, 5143, 5149, 5152, 5153, 5211, 5214,
5310, 5321, 5323, 5324, 5331, 5411, 5611, 5612, 5613, 5619, 5811, 5996, 6113, 6311, 6314, 6411, 6412, 6413, 6414, 6415, 6416, 6417, 6421,
6516, 6521, 6534, 6611, 6612, 6672, 6711, 6712, 6713, 6714, 6715, 6731, 6732, 6741, 6742, 6743, 6747, 6748, 6750, 6761, 6762, 6770, 6821,
6822, 6832, 6842, 6852, 6862, 6880, 6932.
Homogeneous Products
0011, 0012, 0013, 0014, 0111, 0113, 0116, 0121, 0312, 0410, 0421, 0422, 0430, 0440, 0451, 0452, 0459, 0513, 0517, 0535, 0541, 0611, 0612,
0615, 0711, 0721, 0741, 0751, 0813, 0913, 2214, 2311, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2621, 2622, 2628, 2631, 2640, 2651, 2653, 2654, 2813, 2814, 2820,
3310, 3321, 3322, 3323, 3324, 4212, 4214, 4217, 4221, 4222, 4223, 4225, 4229, 5133, 6512, 6513, 6514, 6811, 6812, 6831, 6841, 6851, 6861,
6871, 6872, 9610.
The classification is according to Rauch (1999) as found in Jon Haveman’s Website. There are two classifications the conservative and
the liberal. We have chosen the conservative Classification. Moreover, the classification refers to SITC Revision 2 at the 4 digit. We obtain
the correspondence between SITC Revision 2 and the classification used in this paper, SITC Revision 1 and we matched the corresponding
codes. Then following the information about the Rauch classification we splitted the SITC Revision 1 codes into the 3 categories shown
above.
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Table 22: Descriptive Stastics-4 digit data
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
4 digit unweighted data
Real Aggregate Exports 1917.03 19780.72 0 2090517
Log Real Aggregate Exports 2.85732 3.601741 -11.77593 14.55292
Intensive Margin 16.98378 214.2926 0 40595.32
Log Intensive Margin 0.0934957 2.309946 -15.11879 10.61141
Extensive Margin 67.90422 111.2422 1 609
Log Extensive Margin 2.749157 1.894087 0 6.411819
4 digit weighted data
Real Aggregate Exports 1932.327 20104.58 0 2285269
Log Real Aggregate Exports 2.855788 3.605703 -11.77593 14.64199
Intensive Margin 17.11357 217.6923 0 40595.32
Log Intensive Margin 0.0916773 2.317568 -15.11879 10.61141
Extensive Margin 67.90422 111.2422 1 609
Log Extensive Margin 2.749157 1.894087 0 6.411819
Gravity variables
One in WTO 0.4011438 0.4901305 0 1
Both in WTO 0.5148031 0.4997812 0 1
RTA 0.0436358 0.2042837 0 1
One in RTA 0.4195297 0.4934825 0 1
CU 0.0138618 0.1169175 0 1
Log Distance 8.633612 0.8088826 4.546198 9.885839
Log GDP Exporter 19.4186 2.313779 12.66205 25.39133
Log GDP Importer 19.20937 2.41991 12.66205 25.39133
Log GDP per Capita Exporter 3.366452 1.597665 -0.4637909 6.361107
Log GDP per Capita Importer 3.332576 1.597416 -0.4637909 6.361107
Common Language 0.1825056 0.386261 0 1
Common Border 0.0263238 0.1600965 0 1
Landlocked Exporter 0.1262378 0.3321174 0 1
Landlocked Importer 0.1309699 0.3373677 0 1
Island Exporter 0.1640814 0.3703498 0 1
Island Importer 0.1793031 0.3836063 0 1
Log Area Exporter 12.04432 2.307353 3.970292 16.65315
Log Area Importer 11.89706 2.411583 3.970292 16.65315
Common Colonizer 0.1032862 0.3043326 0 1
Current Colony 0.0005526 0.0235011 0 1
Ever Colony 0.0221609 0.1472069 0 1
Same Country 0.0124087 0.1107013 0 1
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Table 23: Descriptive Stastics-5 digit data
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
5 digit unweighted data
Real Aggregate Exports 1330.231 12323.51 0 1311632
Log Real Aggregate Exports 2.225761 3.651161 -11.77593 14.08678
Intensive Margin 19.19378 316.2417 0 43431.09
Log Intensive Margin -0.5356093 2.257228 -11.77593 10.67893
Extensive Margin 81.46712 147.2512 1 918
Log Extensive Margin 2.761365 1.979976 0 6.822197
5 digit weighted data
Real Aggregate Exports 1349.887 12805.01 0 1580579
Log Real Aggregate Exports 2.227214 3.655494 -11.77593 14.2733
Intensive Margin 19.2822 318.5162 0 43431.09
Log Intensive Margin -0.5344612 2.262502 -11.77593 10.67893
Extensive Margin 81.46712 147.2512 1 918
Log Extensive Margin 2.761365 1.979976 0 6.822197
Gravity Variables
One in WTO 0.9247459 0.2638011 0 1
Both in WTO 0.5336093 0.4988696 0 1
RTA 0.0491332 0.2161463 0 1
One in RTA 0.4410022 0.4965075 0 1
CU 0.0147788 0.1206666 0 1
Log Distance 8.603989 0.8285542 4.546198 9.885839
Log GDP Exporter 19.62579 2.294536 12.66205 25.39133
Log GDP Importer 19.30668 2.443062 12.66205 25.39133
Log GDP per Capita Exporter 3.480504 1.590173 -0.4637909 6.361107
Log GDP per Capita Importer 3.388688 1.610008 -0.4637909 6.361107
Common Language 0.181078 0.3850831 0 1
Common Border 0.0291866 0.1683294 0 1
Landlocked Exporter 0.1199053 0.324851 0 1
Landlocked Importer 0.1333708 0.3399753 0 1
Island Exporter 0.1609953 0.367527 0 1
Island Importer 0.1765474 0.3812856 0 1
Log Area Exporter 12.06573 2.307944 3.970292 16.65315
Log Area Importer 11.91956 2.392614 3.970292 16.65315
Common Colonizer 0.0965121 0.2952925 0 1
Current Colony 0.0006334 0.0251585 0 1
Ever Colony 0.0250465 0.1562664 0 1
Same Country 0.0134713 0.1152817 0 1
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